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Introduction
The history of railroad retirement begins in the private sector, 
at the end of the nineteenth century, when the railroads created the 
nation’s earliest private sector employee pension programs. But since 
the Great Depression, when the government took over these employer 
plans, Railroad Retirement has been a government program. Like 
Social Security, also created in the Great Depression, Railroad Retire-
ment is funded by a payroll tax on workers and employers, the ben-
efi ts paid out are defi ned by an act of Congress, and its assets are 
government assets. 
In 2001, however, a key component of the program was privatized. 
Railroad Retirement covers workers who are primarily employed by 
large rail corporations and represented by strong rail labor unions. In 
the late 1990s, these employers and unions developed a plan to priva-
tize the investment of Railroad Retirement assets. These assets, until 
then, had only been invested in government bonds. The industry plan 
would invest Railroad Retirement assets like the assets held in private 
sector pension trusts—in equities and other private sector securities, 
which have much higher expected returns than the returns on govern-
ment bonds. 
Rail management and labor saw the higher expected returns on 
equities as allowing a cut in Railroad Retirement payroll taxes and/
or an increase in Railroad Retirement benefi ts. These gains were not 
free. Equities are riskier than government bonds, as well as offering 
higher expected returns. The industry plan thus included a mechanism 
that automatically raised taxes, if necessary, to keep the program on 
track. The parties accepted this risk, and on balance saw investing 
Railroad Retirement assets in equities as benefi cial. 
Congress was generally inclined to enact the industry plan. The 
major concern was the precedent it set for Social Security, which was 
a much larger program and covered nearly the entire U.S. workforce. 
More to the point, the Social Security Trust Fund held about 100 
times the assets as the Railroad Retirement program. If just 40 percent 
xiii
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of those assets were invested in equities, Social Security could soon 
own 5 percent of the U.S. stock market. To many, this crossed a criti-
cal line and opened the door to unwanted government involvement in 
the private economy. 
Congress enacted the industry plan in 2001 with one major 
change: it allowed the investment of Railroad Retirement assets in 
equities, but it removed, as best it could, government involvement in 
the investment process. It created a private sector trust—the National 
Railroad Retirement Investment Trust (NRRIT)—to invest Railroad 
Retirement assets in equities. Private sector employer and union 
Trustees would oversee NRRIT’s operations. The government would 
receive periodic fi nancial reports and could take legal action should 
NRRIT fail to meet its fi duciary obligations, but Congress otherwise 
excluded government employees from any participation in NRRIT’s 
operations. 
The book analyzes this reform and its implications going forward. 
Chapter 1 reviews the history of railroad retirement programs to the 
late 1980s, from their origins in the private sector to the government 
takeover in the 1930s, to the expansion of Railroad Retirement in 
the postwar period, to the benefi t cuts and tax increases needed in 
the 1980s to keep the program afl oat. Chapter 2 discusses the grow-
ing appeal of equity investment as a way to reduce payroll taxes and 
restore lost benefi ts, and the diffi cult management-labor negotiations 
needed to develop a proposal that could capture these gains. Chap-
ter 3 discusses the diffi cult negotiations needed to win congressional 
enactment, negotiations made especially diffi cult by the precedent it 
seemed to set for investing Social Security assets in equities. Chapter 
4 reviews the experience of the reformed program to date and offers 
a case study of management-labor collaboration in overseeing pen-
sion investments. It also discusses the ability of the program’s unique 
automatic adjustment mechanism to negotiate the diffi cult fi nancial 
markets in the fi rst dozen years after the reform. Chapter 5 discusses 
the effect of the reform on rail workers and companies, with special 
attention given to the potential impact on employer tax rates. Chapter 
xiv
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6 discusses implications for Social Security. It fi nds no signifi cant 
lessons on the issue that most concerned Congress in 2001—how to 
invest Social Security assets in equities without government involve-
ment in the private economy—but an important example of the value 
of an automatic adjustment mechanism, such as that introduced in the 
reformed Railroad Retirement program. 
xv
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Chapter 1
A Brief History of Railroad 
Retirement Programs
The railroads were the fi rst U.S. private sector industry to make 
pensions a standard feature in its personnel management systems. The 
fi rst plans appeared in the late nineteenth century as part of corpo-
rate “industrial insurance” programs, which protect workers and their 
families against the loss of wages due to death, disability, or being 
too old to work. Management’s objective was to win the loyalty of 
employees and diminish the appeal of unions, which offered com-
petitive benefi t programs. After the turn of the century, rail manage-
ment increasingly used pensions for a different purpose. As the rail 
labor force aged and an increasing number of elderly workers held 
jobs they could no longer effectively perform, management increas-
ingly used pensions to help terminate employment relationships—as 
a sweetener in compulsory retirement programs (Sass 1997). 
Company plans covered 1.5 million rail workers, 75 percent of 
the industry workforce, by 1919 and accounted for the bulk of all 
private sector workers covered by employer plans. Over the following 
decade, prefunding future obligations came to be recognized as “best 
practice” pension plan management. But the railroads had become a 
fi nancially weak industry, due largely to the emergence of intercity 
truck competition. So they continued to operate their plans on a pay-
as-you-go basis. Burdened with high fi xed costs and a harshly com-
petitive environment, the railroads entered the Depression strapped 
for cash, paying benefi ts to 56,000 pension benefi ciaries in 1933 
(Railroad Retirement Board 2010; Sass 1997). 
NATIONALIZING RAILROAD RETIREMENT
As the burdens of pension payments stressed the carriers’ frag-
ile fi nances, a grassroots organization of rail workers—from retirees 
1
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seeking to secure their pensions to young workers seeking to keep 
their jobs by retiring their elders—turned to the federal government. 
Rail workers were politically infl uential, as they were numerous and 
dispersed throughout the nation; the railroads were already heavily 
regulated and seen as a critical national industry; the Depression was 
a national economic emergency; and Franklin Roosevelt’s coalition 
was busily fashioning a New Deal for America. So, in 1934, the rail 
workers succeeded in having Congress nationalize the carrier’s plans. 
Like the Social Security program enacted one year later, the federal 
Railroad Retirement program was funded on a pay-as-you go basis 
with equal employer and employee contributions. And because rail 
workers had this plan, they were excluded from the Social Security 
program enacted one year later.1  
New Deal reforms also signifi cantly enhanced the role of unions, 
and pensions were explicitly ruled an issue subject to collective bar-
gaining in the early postwar period. While Railroad Retirement was 
now a government program, benefi t changes were typically the result 
of labor-management negotiations, which Congress then enacted. In 
the postwar period, Congress expanded benefi ts to keep pace with 
benefi ts provided by Social Security (adding spousal and survivor 
benefi ts) and benefi ts negotiated in collectively bargained plans (add-
ing early retirement on full benefi ts and “occupational” disability, 
which grants disability benefi ts if the worker can work but not in his 
or her current occupation). Funding nevertheless remained pay-as-
you-go, and the railroads remained fi nancially weak, with rapidly 
declining employment (Salmon 2013; Stover 1997; Winston 2006). 
In 1974, the same year Congress “rationalized” employer plans 
with the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), it ratio-
nalized Railroad Retirement. It divided the program into two tiers, 
with Tier I essentially replicating Social Security and Tier II clearly 
identifi ed as the industry’s supplementary “employer” pension pro-
gram. Tier I taxes and benefi ts would now be transferred to and from 
the Social Security Trust Fund: the Railroad Retirement Tier I pro-
gram in essence was a Social Security “pass-through.” The legislation 
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also reduced the employee tax to the Social Security employee tax, 
with amounts needed for benefi ts above Social Security payments now 
borne by the carriers alone. Where each had paid 10.6 percent of cov-
ered earnings, employees now paid just the Social Security employee 
tax of 5.85 percent, and their employers paid 15.35 percent, with the 
Social Security employer tax of 5.85 percent sent to Social Security 
and 9.5 percent retained by Railroad Retirement (see Table 1.1) (Rail-
road Retirement Board 2009, 2010; Salmon 2013; Whitman 2008). 
The Railroad Retirement Tier II program was responsible for 
paying retirees a monthly benefi t equal to 0.7 percent of average 
earnings over their highest 60 months of earnings for each year of 
service. It also retained the obligation to pay certain sweetened Social 
Security benefi ts, known as “Excess Tier I” benefi ts. A key provi-
sion in the 1974 legislation was the introduction of “60/30”—a pro-
vision allowing workers aged 60 with 30 years of service to retire 
on unreduced benefi ts—unreduced Tier I Social Security benefi ts as 
well as unreduced Tier II benefi ts. The legislation did eliminate future 
windfall “dual” benefi t entitlements, which had allowed rail workers 
who qualifi ed for Social Security benefi ts based on nonrailroad work 
to get unusually high Social Security benefi ts, paid for by Railroad 
Retirement.2 Despite the elimination of future dual entitlements, the 
addition of 60/30 increased the program’s obligations. Unless other-
wise stated, all further references to Railroad Retirement taxes and 
benefi ts refer only to Tier II taxes and benefi ts, including Excess Tier 
I benefi ts. 
Table 1.1  The 1974 Division of Railroad Retirement Benefi ts and Tax 
Revenues (%)
Payroll tax
Benefi t Employee Employer Total
Tier 1 Social Security 5.85 5.85 11.70
Tier 2 Railroad Retirement + 
excess Tier I benefi ts
9.50 9.50
Total 5.85 15.35 21.20
SOURCE: Commission on Railroad Reform (1990).
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The shift in the payroll tax from workers to employers exacer-
bated the serious fi nancial pressures on U.S. railroads. Over 20 per-
cent of the nation’s rail mileage, including the iconic Penn Central, 
would enter bankruptcy in the 1970s. Assets in the Railroad Retire-
ment Account at the U.S. Treasury also fell sharply, from three times 
annual benefi t payments in 1970 to barely an eight-month cushion 
in 1979. Both the industry and its retirement program thus ended the 
decade fi nancially distressed (Stover 1997; Winston 2006).
BACKGROUND FOR REFORM: THE 1980s WATERSHED
The 1980s marked a watershed in the fi nances of the railroad 
industry, setting the stage for initiatives that would result in the 2001 
reform of the Railroad Retirement program. The key events were the 
Staggers Rail Act of 1980; the shoring up of Railroad Retirement 
fi nances, primarily in legislation enacted in 1983; and a management 
proposal to privatize railroad retirement, which would evolve into an 
initiative to invest Railroad Retirement assets in a manner similar to 
the way assets are invested in private plans. 
The Staggers Act was part of a broader initiative that loosened 
federal regulation of the nation’s major transportation systems—the 
Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, the Motor Carrier Act of 1980, and 
the Staggers Rail Act for railroads. Deregulation ushered in a dra-
matic decline in railroad rates—rates on average were cut in half—
and a dramatic rise in railroad profi ts (Figure 1.1). The explanation 
was a dramatic rise in productivity due to industry consolidation, the 
abandonment of uneconomic lines, the growth of long-haul coal and 
intermodal traffi c, and a far more intensive use of a “right-sized” rail-
road system (Caves, Christensen, and Swanson 2010–2011; Martland 
2012; Stover 1997).
While the Staggers Act rejuvenated the railroads, it inadvertently 
undermined the fragile fi nances of the industry’s retirement program. 
Railroad Retirement was a pay-as-you-go plan, with benefi ts fi nanced 
by a tax on current payroll. The ratio of benefi ciaries to workers is 
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critical to the health of such programs, and by 1980 the ratio had 
become decidedly worrisome. The number of benefi ciaries had more 
than doubled since 1950, while the number of workers had declined 
by well over half. So taxes on each active worker in 1980 funded the 
benefi ts of two benefi ciaries, up from just 0.3 in 1950. The decline in 
railroad employment had nevertheless slowed in the 1970s, while the 
number of benefi ciaries, which is relatively predictable, would slowly 
plateau and then trend down. But the effi ciencies that the Staggers Act 
introduced accelerated the decline in railroad employment. By the 
end of the 1980s, taxes on each active worker would need to pay the 
benefi ts of 3.2 benefi ciaries (Figures 1.2a and 1.2b). 
Congress responded to the rising ratio of benefi ciaries to work-
ers in 1981, raising the Railroad Retirement payroll tax on employers 
from 9.5 to 11.75 percent of payroll and initiating a 2 percent tax on 
Figure 1.1  Rail Industry Return on Investment: Before and After the 
1980 Staggers Act
4.0
5.0
6.0
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8.0
9.0
%
0.0
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3.0
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SOURCE: Association of American Railroads (2011).
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Figure 1.2a  Railroad Retirement Benefi ciaries and Active Railroad 
Employment, 1950–1990 (000s)
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Figure 1.2b  Ratio of Railroad Retirement Benefi ciaries to Active 
Employees, 1950–1990
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SOURCE: Railroad Retirement Board Annual Reports, various years.
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workers, in addition to the “Social Security” payroll tax employers 
and workers paid. 
The accelerated decline in railroad employment would in time 
require higher Railroad Retirement taxes or lower Railroad Retirement 
benefi ts. But the sharp recession of 1980–1982 brought the crisis on 
much sooner. Rail employment fell below 400,000 in 1983, a 25 
percent decline from its level in 1980, and the Railroad Retirement 
Board, the government agency responsible for managing the pro-
gram, was considering a 40 percent cut in benefi ts (Commission on 
Railroad Retirement Reform 1990, p. 275).3  
As it turned out, 1983 was the year Congress enacted a major 
reform of the Social Security program, signifi cantly raising taxes and 
cutting benefi ts to address a large funding shortfall. Immediately after 
completing work on Social Security, the House Committee on Ways 
and Means turned to Railroad Retirement. Seeing parallels with Social 
Security, Ways and Means drafted a bill that signifi cantly raised Rail-
road Retirement taxes and cut Railroad Retirement benefi ts. The leg-
islation increased the payroll tax nearly 40 percent over three years, 
from 13.75 to 19 percent of payroll, raising the tax on workers to 
4.25 percent and the tax on carriers to 14.75 percent (Figure 1.3). It 
also cut benefi ts. It eliminated 60/30—retirement at age 60 on unre-
duced Tier I benefi ts for workers with 30 years of service—requiring 
workers with 30 years of service to be at least age 62 to retire on 
unreduced Tier I benefi ts. It also eliminated Tier II survivor benefi ts, 
providing widow(er)s just a continuation of much lower spousal ben-
efi ts.4 Further bolstering the program, and also similar to the 1983 
Social Security reform, the legislation subjected Railroad Retirement 
benefi ts to income taxation and returned the proceeds to the Railroad 
Retirement Account.5 Section 502 of the legislation also called for 
the Railroad Retirement Actuary to submit an annual report on the 
program’s fi nances. Unlike most prior and subsequent reforms of the 
system, the 1983 changes were not the result of a labor-management 
joint initiative, but proposals imposed by Congress to address the 
severe fi nancial crisis.  
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While U.S. employment recovered strongly from the sharp 
recessions of the early 1980s, continued declines in railroad employ-
ment renewed concerns over the fi nances of the Railroad Retirement 
program. The Offi ce of Management and Budget (OMB) proposed 
another large tax increase. Rail management and labor resisted and 
responded by negotiating a compromise, which Congress accepted. 
It raised the payroll tax another 10 percent, to 21 percent of payroll, 
with the tax on workers rising to 4.9 percent and the tax on carriers 
to 16.1 percent (Figure 1.3). Congress also created a commission to 
examine the long-run fi nancing of the program, including a review of 
other funding options.
In less than a decade, the Railroad Retirement payroll tax had 
gone from 9.5 percent of payroll, paid entirely by the carriers, to 21 
percent of payroll, with the carriers paying 16.1 and workers 4.9 per-
cent. It had gone from an annoyance to what Drew Lewis, Chair-
Figure 1.3  Railroad Retirement Tier II Tax Rate, 1975–1988
21 0
18.0
.
Carrier Worker
15.0
9.0
12.0
%
6.0
0 0
3.0
.
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SOURCE: Railroad Retirement Board Annual Reports, various years.
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man of the Union Pacifi c, called the industry’s “foremost legislative 
concern”—a concern that would result in a major reform of the Rail-
road Retirement program (Salmon 2013).
Notes
 1. While the 1934 legislation was declared unconstitutional by the 
Supreme Court, revised legislation passed muster (Sass 1997; Whitman 
2008; Railroad Retirement Board 2010).
 2. The windfall dual benefi t had been an inadvertent result of Social Secu-
rity’s procedure of basing benefi ts on the average of a worker’s indexed 
earnings over all years since 1950 (or their highest 35 years of indexed 
earnings after 1985). Workers needed 10 years of employment covered 
by Social Security to qualify for benefi ts. But earnings from 10 or more 
years of nonrailroad work would be averaged over the lesser of 35 years 
or all years since 1950, making a rail worker appear like a lower earner. 
As Social Security replaced a much larger share of a low earner’s wages, 
this procedure provided rail workers a benefi t that replaced a high per-
centage of those average earnings, and a very generous benefi t for rela-
tively few years of covered employment.
 3. Legislation enacted in 1981 had mandated a cut in benefi ts should the 
program have insuffi cient revenues (Railroad Retirement Board 2009, 
p. 7).
 4. Spouses had been entitled to “spousal benefi ts” when the worker was 
alive and “survivor benefi ts” upon widowhood. Tier II spousal benefi ts 
were 45 percent of the worker’s Tier II benefi t, and the survivor ben-
efi t was the worker’s actual Tier II benefi t. Tier II benefi ts were par-
tially indexed to infl ation—increased by 32.5 percent of the increase 
in prices—and thus also lost signifi cant value by the time most spouses 
became widows. 
 5. Prior to the 1983 acts, neither Social Security nor Railroad Retirement 
benefi ts were taxed (Commission on Railroad Retirement Reform 1990, 
p. 120ff.).
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Chapter 2
The Appeal of Equity Investment
The government-run Railroad Retirement program is a clear anom-
aly in the U.S. economic landscape. In the late 1980s, many gov-
ernment offi cials would have gladly returned the program, with its 
fi nancial, administrative, and political burdens, back to the private 
sector. The OMB even drafted a bill in 1988 to do just that. As the for-
tunes of the railroads revived in the 1980s, and as the Railroad Retire-
ment payroll tax exploded and Railroad Retirement assets rebounded 
(Figure 2.1), offi cials in Lewis’s Union Pacifi c also grew interested in 
reform. They saw investing in equities as a way to reduce the cost of 
the program and viewed privatization as the only way that this could 
be done. By the late 1980s, offi cials in the Union Pacifi c tax depart-
ment had sketched out a plan.1   
THE APPEAL OF PRIVATIZATION
Privatization was complicated. Would existing workers and ben-
efi ciaries be transferred to the new private program? Would a priva-
tized program retain unique “government” features, specifi cally the 
return of income taxes on benefi ts? Could the industry extract a price 
for assuming this federal government liability, especially liabilities 
it viewed as unfair impositions, such as windfall dual benefi ts, and 
for having been forced to invest assets in the Railroad Retirement 
Account in low-yielding government bonds? How would the program 
be managed? And how would the transition occur?2 
The Union Pacifi c plan of the late 1980s was hardly fully devel-
oped. But the outlines were clear. It would establish a standard, 
industrywide, collectively bargained, multiemployer plan for new 
hires while existing workers and benefi ciaries would remain in a “leg-
acy Tier II” program. The assets of the new plan would be invested as 
the assets in any private plan; the assets of the legacy program would 
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continue to be invested in government bonds. The plan, not surpris-
ingly, also called for the continued return of income taxes on Railroad 
Retirement benefi ts and government “restitution” payments for the 
unfair burdens it had imposed on the program in the past. The plan 
would also continue current tax/contribution rates, on both new and 
existing workers, with amounts in excess of ERISA funding require-
ments for the plan for new hires “taxed” and transferred to the legacy 
Tier II program. When the legacy program was “fully funded”—when 
assets in the legacy Railroad Retirement Account equaled the present 
value of legacy Tier II obligations—the transition to a privatized Rail-
road Retirement would be complete. 
Key elements of the Union Pacifi c design won the endorsement 
of the Commission on Railroad Retirement Reform, which the com-
promise 1987 legislation had established to examine the program’s 
long-run fi nancing options. The commission’s 1990 report, however, 
also included recommendations opposed by the carriers (a change 
Figure 2.1  Railroad Retirement Accounts-Benefi ts Ratio
SOURCE: Railroad Retirement Board Annual Reports, various years.
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in the way payroll taxes were calculated) and labor (cuts in early 
retirement benefi ts and a more stringent disability program). As nei-
ther management nor labor supported the commission’s package of 
reforms, the industry did not approach Congress urging enactment 
of its recommendations. The commission report also declared Rail-
road Retirement fi nancially healthy, so there was no need for action. 
The commission’s recommendations thus were never considered by 
Congress.3  
The appeal of privatization nevertheless persisted in the tax 
department of the Union Pacifi c and with senior tax professionals at 
other railroads. The focus at Union Pacifi c was to lower the cost of 
the program. Others in the industry saw the program producing large 
future surpluses as the large number of legacy pensioners died off and 
the tax rate remained unchanged, which would be costly and invite 
demands from labor for increased benefi ts.4  
However, senior rail management and the staff in the industry 
trade association, the Association of American Railroads (AAR), 
were cautious. Going to Congress was risky. Industry leaders, more-
over, were primarily concerned with the mergers then consolidating 
the nation’s major freight carriers into four giant roads, and with the 
resulting complications in relations with unions and government reg-
ulators. By reducing the number of major players in the industry, the 
mergers in time would simplify the task of forming a carrier consen-
sus on reforming Railroad Retirement. But launching a major initia-
tive to privatize the pension program while the mergers were under 
way would only complicate these high-stakes maneuvers, especially 
with labor (Salmon 2013, pp. 19–20). 
In 1995, a path forward opened. The Social Security Advisory 
Council was then considering major reforms to close Social Secu-
rity’s long-term fi nancing shortfall, including “privatization” mea-
sures such as the creation of individual accounts and the investment 
of Social Security Trust Fund assets in equities. Any such reform 
would likely affect government policy on Railroad Retirement. So 
rail industry tax offi cials used this development to pressure the AAR 
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to review the carriers’ positions on the industry’s pension program. 
Like most industry trade associations, the AAR was risk adverse and 
reticent to take on controversial initiatives without broad support. But 
given the attention on Social Security reform, it authorized the devel-
opment of an updated industry position on Railroad Retirement in 
January 1995 (Salmon 2013, p. 12). 
Responsibility for developing the industry position fell to the 
AAR Tax Policy Committee, led by Jim Hixon of Norfolk South-
ern. Hixon in turn created a Tax Working Group (TWG) to develop a 
plan. The group’s key members included Hixon, Union Pacifi c’s Ber-
nie Gutschewski, Jim Peter of CSX, Dan Westerbeck of what would 
become BNSF, and two key contributors to the Union Pacifi c’s work 
on Railroad Retirement, lawyer John Salmon of Dewey Ballantine 
and economist Randy Weiss of Deloitte & Touche. 
The TWG essentially adopted the Union Pacifi c plan, adjusted 
to function as the opening position in a negotiation. For example, 
the proposal it developed would transfer to the government the pro-
gram’s “excess Tier I” benefi ts—benefi ts based on the Social Secu-
rity benefi t formula but far more generous than what Social Security 
provides. Excess Tier I benefi ts were expensive. They included items 
such as retirement on full benefi ts at age 62 with 30 years of service, 
as opposed to full benefi ts only available at Social Security’s “Full 
Retirement Age” of 65; and “occupational” disability, which granted 
benefi ts to workers unable to perform their occupational tasks, even 
if capable of working in some other occupation. The working group 
knew the government would likely balk at the transfer, but it wanted 
to remove these issues in any initial negotiations with labor, which 
would inevitably come before any negotiation with the government, 
to clear the decks to discuss privatizing the Tier II program. And there 
was always the outside chance that the government might accept a 
portion of these benefi t obligations (Salmon 2013, pp. 12–18). 
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COURTING LABOR
The path forward again opened in 1997. As part of an interim 
compromise in a contentious dispute over occupational disability 
benefi ts, the rail unions had agreed to meet with management to dis-
cuss Railroad Retirement issues. The meeting took place during a 
break in the scheduled program at rail labor’s winter meetings. At that 
meeting, Hixon and Salmon from the TWG highlighted threats to the 
status quo—initiatives to reform Social Security, the shift from tradi-
tional employer pensions to 401(k)s, and the high cost of the Railroad 
Retirement program. Then they explained the virtues of privatiza-
tion—how the higher returns on assets could lower the program’s cost 
and the taxes paid by labor and management. The assembled union 
offi cials sat through the presentation and, by prior agreement among 
themselves, made no comments and left the room without asking any 
questions (Salmon 2013, pp. 21–23; TWG 1995). 
Labor had little interest in management’s proposal. The carriers’ 
primary interest in Railroad Retirement was cost, and the primary 
argument for privatization in the TWG presentation was a reduction 
in cost. Labor’s primary interest was benefi t security. Railroad Retire-
ment benefi ts were statutory, defi ned in an act of Congress. The law 
stipulated that benefi ts would be cut if revenues were insuffi cient, but 
the program was fi nancially sound; the carriers paid most of the bill; 
and labor was confi dent that Congress would shore up the program 
if need be. Labor was also concerned that going to Congress with 
such a radical proposal risked a review of the existing benefi t pack-
age, specifi cally, excess Tier I benefi ts that the 1990 Commission on 
Railroad Retirement Reform had recommended be eliminated. Thus, 
labor saw no reason to accept a modest tax cut in exchange for the far 
less certain benefi ts of a private plan and risk revisions in the legacy 
program (TWG 1995).5 
The one element in management’s presentation that did intrigue 
some in labor was the investment of Railroad Retirement assets in 
equities. Most union pension funds invested in equities. Equities had 
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been stellar performers over the past two decades, with annual returns 
averaging over 13 percent above infl ation (Figure 2.2). So while “past 
performance is no guarantee of future performance,” many union offi -
cials were quite comfortable with investing the program’s assets in 
equities.6
The turning point came when labor saw the “gain” from invest-
ing in equities as increased benefi ts, not lower taxes. Labor specifi -
cally targeted a restoration of two key benefi ts lost in the 1983 reform: 
retirement on full benefi ts at aged 60 with 30 years of service and, 
secondarily, more ample survivor benefi ts for widow(er)s. 
A catalyst that brought the two sides together was a September 
17, 1998, congressional hearing on a resolution that urged rail labor 
and management to negotiate improved benefi ts for the 250,000 
widow(er)s that the program supported—30 percent of program ben-
efi ciaries (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 1994).7 
While the hearing focused on an expansion of benefi ts, a union repre-
sentative was explicitly asked whether he could “support a change in 
Tier II investment policies to allow for equity investment to increase 
the rate of return on fund assets” (Salmon 2013, pp. 23–25). 
With both sides seeing the value of investing in Railroad Retire-
ment assets in equities, the negotiations began. What followed was 
the standard labor-management kabuki dance, with each side sending 
out highly stylized messages, wary of giving too much and getting too 
little. Thus C. V. Monin, International President of the Brotherhood of 
Locomotive Engineers, wrote the Subcommittee on October 1,
The carriers indicated they wanted to discuss survivor benefi ts 
only as part of Labor/Management dialogue on all aspects of 
railroad retirement. My experience is that we can succeed in 
reaching a quick agreement to improve survivor benefi ts only 
if we stay focused on that issue and not muddy the waters by 
including all other issues. However, Rail Labor stands ready to 
discuss any and all aspects of the railroad retirement system so 
long as those discussions are aimed at preserving and protecting 
the solvency and stability of our retirement program. 
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If the railroads truly want to open all aspects of the railroad 
retirement system to new Labor/Management dialogue, they 
should be aware that Rail Labor has a number of items to 
include on the discussion agenda. (Quoted in Salmon [2013], 
pp. 25–27.)
To which Edward R. Hamberger, President and Chief Executive 
Offi cer of the Association of American Railroads, responded on Octo-
ber 30, 
As I stated in my testimony on September 17, AAR stands ready 
to discuss opportunities for improving our legislated retirement 
plan with rail labor and has made several overtures over the past 
two years to initiate such discussions …
AAR and its member companies believe that out of such discus-
sions might grow opportunities to lower the substantial payroll 
tax burden now carried by all railroad taxpayers, both employ-
ers and employees, while at the same time maintaining the value 
of the total package of benefi ts provided to covered participants. 
Only within the context of general discussions is this desirable 
outcome a real possibility. The importance of a broad consider-
ation is heightened by the potential for major legislative changes 
in the Social Security system, which would inevitably affect 
Railroad Retirement. (Quoted in Salmon [2013], pp. 25–27.)
NEGOTIATING REFORM
On December 9, 1998, the two sides met, and labor, for the fi rst 
time, was now actively engaged in the negotiating process. Labor 
emphasized that benefi t security was its paramount concern, expressed 
clear opposition to privatization, and put its benefi t demands on the 
table. Labor also indicated its seriousness by asking for details about 
management’s projections, informing management that it would be 
securing its own fi nancial advisor, and asking that the actuary at the 
Railroad Retirement Board be available as an impartial resource 
(Salmon 2013). 
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The basic outline of a deal soon emerged, and it was dramatically 
different from management’s original proposal. There would be no 
new private plan. Labor insisted that Railroad Retirement remain a 
government program with “statutory” benefi ts. But there would be 
equity investment, with Railroad Retirement assets invested much 
like the assets in private employer plans. The assets would be man-
aged by a nine-person board composed of three management, three 
labor, and three public trustees from the Railroad Retirement Board. 
And the expected gains from the higher return on equities would pro-
vide tax cuts for management and enhanced benefi ts for labor. 
While the outline was clear, closing the deal was hardly straight-
forward. Labor and management had to agree on the size of the gain, 
how to divide it, and how to divide the risks that equity investment 
entailed. These issues were complex and interconnected. There was 
no guarantee that a deal could be struck that gave each side enough of 
what it needed. For the negotiations to proceed, each also had to sepa-
rate the other side’s opening gambits from their basic demands, give 
up their own gambits and bargain in “good faith,” and trust the other 
side to respond in kind. The negotiations began with management 
proposing and labor reacting. A tactically aggressive management 
proposal, put forward by management at a June collective bargain-
ing session, nearly derailed the process, as labor felt a lack of “good 
faith” reciprocity. But labor regrouped, responded with counter-
proposals, and the negotiations went forward (Salmon 2013). 
Assessing the size and timing of the gain shifted fundamentally 
when privatization was taken off the table. The gain was no longer 
a reduction in the cost of the program at some point in the future. 
It would now be immediate or near-term tax reductions and benefi t 
enhancements, consistent with maintaining an “adequate” balance 
in the Railroad Retirement Account. By the mid-1990s, assets in the 
Railroad Retirement Account had risen above four times annual ben-
efi t outlays for the fi rst time since 1961 (see Figure 2.1). The negotia-
tors thus defi ned an “adequate” balance as assets at least equal to four 
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times annual benefi ts. The ratio of assets to outlays was projected to 
rise over the next decade; turn down in the 2010s and 2020s, with rail-
road employment and payroll tax revenues falling faster than benefi t 
outlays; and then rise sharply as current benefi ciaries died off. So the 
key question in determining the size of the “gain” became how much 
taxes could be cut or benefi ts increased and still have assets equal 
to four times benefi t outlays in the 2010s and 2020s as the “water-
melon passed through the snake”—as the gap between outlays and 
tax receipts widened and had to be fi lled with transfers from the Rail-
road Retirement Account.
The next question was how to divide the gain. Each side made 
reasonable claims. Management, noting it paid over 75 percent of the 
program’s cost, sought a comparable share of the gain. Labor viewed 
the payroll taxes paid by the carriers as part of “labor compensation” 
and claimed the entire gain to avoid a cut in compensation. But before 
push came to shove, each side settled for a 50-50 split (Salmon 2013). 
The negotiators then had to agree on the cost of the desired bene-
fi t enhancements, and whether the gain would be large enough so that 
half the gain would be enough to pay for these enhancements. Most 
troublesome was the restoration of 60/30, labor’s key demand. It was 
by far the most expensive benefi t enhancement, and by far the most 
diffi cult to price.8 The cost, in terms of benefi ts paid and revenues 
lost, depended on how many workers would in fact retire early. The 
cost estimates were necessarily rough, and predictable differences 
of opinion on the assumptions used in these estimates complicated 
the negotiations. Labor also demanded a parallel extension of retiree 
health coverage, a benefi t not provided by Railroad Retirement but 
included in the collectively bargained labor contract. Moreover, two 
unions insisted on 55/30—retirement on full benefi ts at age 55 with 
30 years of service—an extremely expensive proposition. The carriers 
rejected 55/30 out of hand because of concerns about disruptive skill 
shortages as well as its cost. The remaining 11 unions wanted 55/30. 
But they recognized that the funds available were simply too small 
to afford it, without risking the stability of the system. They focused 
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instead on restoring 60/30, which the actuary’s analysis demonstrated 
was an achievable goal without putting long-term solvency at risk.
Then there was risk. Along with their higher expected returns, 
equities were riskier investments than government bonds. The “tax 
adjustment mechanism,” which had been a key element in manage-
ment’s privatization designs, emerged as the program’s critical risk-
management tool. The tax adjustment mechanism, or “ratchet,” had 
been the device in the privatization proposals that reduced the 21 
percent payroll tax in the transition to a private plan. In the initial 
Union Pacifi c design of the late 1980s, it merely eliminated the exist-
ing 21 percent payroll tax when the legacy Tier II program was “fully 
funded,” leaving just the required ERISA contribution for the new 
privatized plan.9 The 1995 TWG design modifi ed the ratchet to kick 
in sooner and provide a more gradual transition to privatization. It 
would establish a target “account benefi ts ratio”—the ratio of assets 
in the Railroad Retirement Account to annual benefi t outlays—and 
cut the payroll tax when the ratio exceeded that target (TWG 1994, 
1995). Now that Railroad Retirement would not be privatized, the 
ratchet became the mechanism for keeping the account benefi ts ratio 
within a target band. Taxes would still be cut should Railroad Retire-
ment Account assets exceed the band’s upper bound, which would be 
set at six times annual outlays. But taxes would rise should assets fall 
below a lower bound—the four times annual outlays the negotiators 
had agreed would be the minimum “adequate” Railroad Retirement 
Account balance.10  
The negotiators then had to decide how this risk would be shared. 
Labor’s position was simple: it insisted on the “division” of risk found 
in collectively bargained private plans, with management bearing all 
the risk and workers none. Labor, in other words, was unwilling to see 
benefi ts cut or the tax on workers raised should the account benefi ts 
ratio fall below four times annual outlays. Management’s position 
was also simple: it saw a direct connection between risk and reward 
as a basic principle of fi nance. So if the carriers took all the risk, they 
claimed they should get all the reward. Management thus responded 
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to labor’s “no risk” demand with an offer in which they took all the 
risk and got nearly all the gain.11  
The ratchet would also be the mechanism for reducing taxes 
after the watermelon had passed through the snake, when the account 
benefi ts ratio was expected to rise above six times benefi t outlays. 
To split the gains of reform 50-50, the unions insisted that those tax 
reductions also be split 50-50.12 Should the ratio subsequently fall, the 
unions agreed that the tax on workers could increase up to the current 
4.9 percent rate. But they insisted that reductions for the carriers cease 
should the tax on workers fall to 0, setting a fl oor of 8.2 percent on 
management’s payroll tax. 
Recognizing that this confl ict over risk sharing was the key 
impediment to reaching a deal, the carriers ultimately agreed to 
labor’s demands. But they insisted on a cap: that the ratchet could 
not push their tax above a specifi ed level, which would be set at 22.1 
percent of payroll. So there would be a limit on how high or low the 
ratchet could set taxes—from a low of 8.2 percent, with the carriers 
paying the entire amount, to a high of 27 percent, with the workers 
paying 4.9 percent and the carriers the rest. On either side of these 
limits, should a 27 percent payroll tax be “too low” or a 8.2 percent 
tax be “too high,” risk management and the fi nancing of Railroad 
Retirement would no longer be automatic but would require a renego-
tiation of the program and a change in the law by Congress. 
Estimating the size of the gain, the cost of benefi ts, the risks to 
the program’s fi nances, and the risks each party would bear, using 
a variety of reasonable assumptions, presented the negotiators with 
an exceedingly confusing “Rubik’s cube” of options.13 They would 
need to decide on various technical details, such as when the new 
program with its lower taxes and higher benefi ts would start, how the 
account benefi ts ratio would be measured, and how the ratchet would 
raise and lower taxes when that ratio strayed beyond the target band 
of assets to outlays. The later the program would start, the greater 
the program’s initial level of projected assets and asset income. To 
avoid controversies and to avoid sharp changes in the payroll tax, 
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the negotiators agreed to measure the account benefi ts ratio as the 
average ratio over a number of trailing years. The fi nances of pension 
plans are typically guided by forward-looking actuarial projections, 
not backward-looking trailing ratios. But trailing ratios are objective 
data, whereas actuarial projections involved judgments that could 
invite disputes. Basing tax rates on actuarial projections could also 
raise constitutional issues, as tax rates would be effectively set by 
actuaries in the executive branch, not by Congress, as constitutionally 
required.14 The ratchet also based tax rates on multiyear averages to 
dampen volatility: neither management nor labor wanted a system in 
which taxes could change each year. Both saw averaging as affecting 
the timing of taxes paid to fund the program—primarily taxes on the 
carriers, which bore the primary burden for funding Railroad Retire-
ment—but not affecting obligations to fund the system. 
The availability of the Railroad Retirement Actuary as an impar-
tial resource was a critical contributor to success of the negotiations. 
The actuary ran projections of different Rubik’s cube combinations 
that both sides could accept, assuming both accepted the assump-
tions the actuary used. The negotiations were also greatly simplifi ed 
with the announcement, in the actuary’s August 1999 annual Section 
502 report to the Railroad Retirement Board, that railroad employ-
ment was, and would likely be, higher than previously projected. Rail 
employment was hard to predict, with projections ranging from a 
mild to a dramatic decline over time. With payroll taxes as the domi-
nant source of Railroad Retirement revenues, assessments of the size 
of the gain and the risks to the program were critically dependent on 
the actuary’s employment projections. The updated August 1999 pro-
jections now indicated that a deal could be reached. 
The actuary’s projections had never shown that a 50-50 split of 
the gain could support 55/30—retirement on full benefi ts at age 55 
with 30 years of service—except assuming very low rates of early 
retirement. Projections based on the August 1999 data did not change 
that assessment. They did, however, indicate that the program could 
support 60/30 in most scenarios if the transition were delayed just 
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a few years. Labor could then get its benefi t enhancements and the 
carriers a 3 percent reduction in their payroll tax. Stress tests showed 
these reforms to be capable of negotiating the “watermelon in the 
snake” using the actuary’s optimistic projection of railroad employ-
ment (Figure 2.3) and likely able to produce enough revenue to pay 
promised benefi ts using the intermediate employment projection. As 
actual rail employment had tended to conform to the actuary’s opti-
mistic projections, the negotiators were generally comfortable with 
these results. While 2 unions continued to hold out for 55/30, the 
other 11 decided to go forward without the two holdouts.
The actuary, however, was not so sanguine. Actuaries by training 
tend to be very cautious, and estimates using the pessimistic employ-
Figure 2.3  Projected Account Balances under the Industry Reform 
Proposal, Optimistic Employment Projection
NOTE: Assumes return on investment of 2 percentage points higher than current RRB 
actuarial assumption of 6 percent. Assumes initial benefi t increases and employer 
tax reductions per agreement. 20th valuation, Assumption 1. Average fund balance 
for 1960–1998 is 2.6 years. The number of years 1960–1998 with balance of 4 or 
more is 4.
SOURCE: Salmon (2013).
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ment projection did not do well. That projection had rail employment 
falling nearly two-thirds by the middle of the century, to a seemingly 
implausible level well below 100,000. Neither Congress nor the 
unions, however, would sign off on a deal that the actuary thought 
too risky, so an urgent negotiation ensued. To avoid sharp changes 
in tax rates, the negotiators had designed a ratchet that measured the 
account benefi ts ratio as the average ratio over the previous 10 years. 
This backward-looking average slowed the ratio’s decline as the cur-
rent ratio of assets to outlays fell below the target lower bound of four 
times annual outlays. To make the mechanism more responsive, in the 
event of potential adverse shocks, a revised proposal increased the 
size of the tax increments to the schedule shown in Figure 2.4. The 
ratchet still failed to produce suffi cient revenues in stress tests using 
the “pessimistic” employment projection, but it gave management, 
Figure 2.4  The Tax Adjustment Ratchet
NOTE: Railroad retirement payroll tax is based on a 10-year average ratio of assets to 
annual outlays. 
SOURCE: Railroad Retirement and Survivor’s Improvement Act (2001 Section 204).
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labor, and Congress more time to respond to shortfalls identifi ed in 
the required annual fi ve-year projections of the program’s fi nances, 
which was enough for the actuary to allow the plan to proceed.
So the deal on the table was set. The carriers would get a three-
percentage-point reduction in their payroll taxes. Labor would get 
early retirement on full benefi ts with 30 years of service, enhanced 
health insurance for early retirees, enhanced survivor benefi ts, and 
fi ve-year vesting. 
Labor, for the most part, accepted the deal. The two unions that 
insisted on 55/30—the Brotherhood of Maintenance and Way Employ-
ees and the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen—did 
not, but the rest were satisfi ed with their portion of the gain. 
The management negotiators reviewed the deal with senior 
management, outlining the benefi ts and risks in a reformed Railroad 
Retirement program. If the projections illustrated in Figure 2.3 prove 
accurate, the cut in the carriers’ payroll tax from 16.1 to 13.1 percent 
would generally remain in place even in the challenging years in the 
near future. The carriers’ tax rate could rise—not above 22.1 per-
cent—but tax rates should fall, possibly below 10 percent by the end 
of the twenty-fi rst century, after the near-term demographic costs of 
the current retiree imbalance are resolved. These tax rates would also 
change automatically, without contentious negotiations with labor or 
the troublesome involvement of Congress. The carriers would bear 
all the risk of funding shortfalls. The most likely cause of a shortfall, 
however, was a sharper than expected employment decline. Such a 
decline could offset much or all of the increase in the payroll tax rate, 
so that the carriers’ total tax (employment × average earnings × the 
payroll tax rate) might not increase much, or at all. To the degree that 
employment declines refl ect increased effi ciency and profi tability, the 
ratchet in fact reduced the carriers’ risk: it adjusted the tax rate in line 
with the carriers’ ability to pay. For some or all of these reasons, the 
carriers also agreed to go forward. 
In January 2000, rail management and a majority of rail unions 
reached an agreement in principle and agreed to go to Congress and 
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jointly support these negotiated increases in Railroad Retirement 
benefi ts, cuts in Railroad Retirement taxes, and the investment of 
Railroad Retirement assets in equities (National Railroad Retirement 
Investment Trust [NRRIT] 2002; Salmon 2013). 
Notes
 1. For a description of the OMB plan, see Commission on Railroad Retire-
ment Reform (1990, pp. 186–188); interview with Randy Weiss, April 
10, 2013; a version of the Union Pacifi c plan was also presented to the 
commission by the “Regional Railroads of America.” 
 2. For a discussion of these complications, see Commission on Railroad 
Retirement Reform (1990, pp. 184–200).
 3. For the commission’s recommendations, see Commission on Rail-
road Retirement Reform (1990, pp. 2–15). Also see Salmon (2013, pp. 
12–13). 
 4. James Hixon, interview with the author, January 6, 2012.
 5. Joel Parker, interview with the author, January 29, 2012. 
 6. Joel Parker, interview with the author, January 29, 2012.
 7. In 1993, retired and disabled workers accounted for 45 percent and 
spouses 55 percent of program benefi ciaries. 
 8. Labor also sought enhanced Tier II survivor benefi ts, but far less vigor-
ously than sweetened early retirement benefi ts. Survivors at the time 
just received a continuation of their spousal benefi t, based on half of 
the worker’s benefi t. The labor negotiators would settle for a survivor 
benefi t equal to the higher of the worker’s benefi t—not indexed to infl a-
tion—or the existing spousal benefi t, which was indexed to infl ation. 
In part because the survivors’ alternative benefi t was not indexed to 
infl ation, this benefi t change was much less expensive than sweetened 
early retirement benefi ts. Labor also demanded fi ve-year vesting, which 
was now required of all private plans. But the additional cost of vesting 
workers with rights to pension benefi ts after 5 years of service, over the 
existing requirement of 10 years of service, was small. 
 9. What tax or contribution would replace the 21 percent payroll tax to 
cover the “normal cost” of any remaining active legacy employees or 
to respond to adverse shocks to the funded status of the legacy program 
was not worked out in the early Union Pacifi c design.
 10. By setting a four-year reserve as the lower bound, the system was 
designed to have signifi cantly higher reserves than found in national 
pay-as-you-go social security programs. 
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 11. This was the proposal, cited above, that the unions viewed as a sign of 
“bad faith.”
 12. There was some interest on labor’s side to convert tax reductions the 
ratchet produced into higher benefi ts. But consensus opted for tax cuts, 
at least initially, to avoid introducing benefi ts the program might not be 
able to maintain. All parties agreed that this was something labor and 
management could renegotiate at a later date. 
 13. John Salmon’s apt description. 
 14. Randy Weiss, interview with the author, April 10, 2013.
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Chapter 3
The Railroad Retirement and 
Survivors’ Improvement Act of 2001
 Railroad Retirement is a unique institution, and reforming the pro-
gram typically follows a unique process. Railroad Retirement is the 
employer pension program of rail workers, who are largely private 
sector workers, and the program is funded by taxes paid solely by 
these workers and their employers. It is also a federal government 
program, and reforms are thus typically initiated by the private sector 
parties, in negotiations between rail management and labor, who then 
bring their proposals to Congress for enactment (Szymendera 2011). 
The 2001 reform largely followed this script. 
INSIDE THE BELTWAY
After negotiating their agreement, in January 2000 rail labor and 
management went to Congress, but getting their deal enacted was 
hardly straightforward. There was concern that the proposed bill low-
ered the age that rail workers could claim full benefi ts while Social 
Security’s full benefi t age was rising, and many reformers were urg-
ing an even higher age. The government’s accounting authorities also 
wanted to score the exchange of the government bonds in the Rail-
road Retirement Account for private securities as a defi cit-widening 
government expenditure, which almost killed the reform. The major 
resistance, however, came from Republican lawmakers and pundits 
who characterized the reform as a dangerous and ill-advised political 
boondoggle.1  
Viewing Railroad Retirement as a private plan, these critics saw 
raising benefi ts and cutting taxes as a crazy response to “a $40 billion 
unfunded liability” (Novak 2001a,b). Viewing Railroad Retirement 
as a government program, they saw these higher benefi ts and lower 
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taxes as busting the budget, adding $7 billion to the federal defi cit 
over the next 10 years.  
The sharpest complaints, however, focused on the investment of 
Railroad Retirement assets in equities. The policy, critics claimed, 
exposed the program to two types of risk: the fi nancial risk in equity 
investment, and the risk of political infl uence on investment deci-
sions. The critics claimed the proposal used the high expected returns 
on equity investment to “make up for lost revenue [and increased ben-
efi ts]” but ignored the increased risk (John 2000, p. 1). They viewed 
this arbitrage—selling bonds to buy stocks, effectively “borrowing 
money from the public and then getting a higher rate of return through 
private investment”—as a pointless shell game. More serious, they 
viewed the investment of government assets in equities as crossing a 
critical redline in the government’s involvement in the private econ-
omy. They feared it would allow “political appointees and govern-
ment bureaucrats” to advance their political and social agendas, which 
would degrade investment performance and, much worse, distort the 
democratic political process (John 2000, p. 2; Novak 2001a,b). The 
record of state and local pension plans, and the plans of other nations, 
were full of examples of such adverse political infl uence (see Brown, 
Pollet, and Weisbenner [2009]; Munnell and Sundén [1983]; Palacios 
[2002]; Sass [1992]). 
Given the relatively modest importance of Railroad Retirement 
in the larger scheme of things, the attack was far more intense than 
one might expect. The real political and policy issue, however, was 
Social Security, not Railroad Retirement. Reforming Social Security 
was a major initiative of the new Bush Administration, whose key 
proposal was to allow workers to direct a portion of their payroll taxes 
to personal retirement savings accounts in exchange for a reduction in 
their future Social Security retirement benefi ts (President’s Commis-
sion to Strengthen Social Security 2001). This would shift the assets 
fi nancing future Social Security–equivalent retirement income from 
the government bonds in the Social Security Trust Fund to equities 
and other securities in these personal accounts. Proponents argued 
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that this would increase national saving and raise the return on “Social 
Security” assets, which, of course, was precisely what the proposed 
shift in Railroad Retirement assets would do. So the problem was not 
so much arbitrage and shell games but how retirement assets and their 
investment in equities would be managed. 
The Democrats under President Clinton had proposed investing 
a portion of Social Security’s $2 trillion Trust Fund, perhaps 40 per-
cent, in stocks (Clinton 1999). The Democrats were confi dent they 
could eliminate political infl uence on the Trust Fund’s investment 
decisions; the Republicans were just as confi dent they could not. It 
would be “almost impossible,” according to Alan Greenspan, “to 
insulate investment decisions from political interference” (quoted in 
John [2000]). And the specter of political infl uence over the Social 
Security Trust Fund, 100 times larger than the Railroad Retirement 
Account, made the investment of Railroad Retirement assets in equi-
ties abhorrent. “Giving bureaucrats the power to invest huge amounts 
of [Railroad Retirement] money in the stock market would create a 
fundamental confl ict of interest between the long-term needs of future 
retirees and short-term political goals. If this model were extended to 
Social Security’s trust funds, the door would open for government 
ownership of a signifi cant portion of the economy” (John 2000, p. 2). 
MEETING THE CHALLENGE: BUDGETARY ACCOUNTING 
Accounting should not infl uence policy, but it does. When the 
industry went to Congress, the initial judgment of the government’s 
budgetary authorities, the Congressional Budget Offi ce (CBO) and 
the OMB, was that the proposed sale of government bonds and pur-
chase of private securities by the Railroad Retirement program should 
be scored as current government expenditure. Initial CBO estimates 
projected the size of the expenditure, and thereby the increase of the 
size of the federal defi cit, at $15.3 billion (CBO 2001). Because this 
almost killed the proposal, the Railroad Retirement reformers had to 
devise a workable alternative.  
Sass.indb   31 12/10/2014   10:26:32 AM
32   Sass
Selling Treasuries and buying private securities of equal value 
would not be considered expenditure in “normal” accounting—the 
transaction would affect neither the income statement nor the bal-
ance sheet—but government accounting is not normal. It is cash not 
accrual accounting. It does not distinguish between the purchase of 
consumption items that will be used within a year, such as copy paper 
or a welfare payment, and the purchase of investment items, such as 
a battleship with a 50-year life expectancy. Expenditures on copy 
paper and expenditures on battleships are both recorded as current 
expenses. Normal accrual accounting, by contrast, would depreciate 
the cost of the battleship over its 50-year life expectancy and consider 
only a portion (say, 1/50th) as a current expense. This is considered 
good practice, as it records an expense when a purchased good or 
service makes an economic contribution. But, for a variety of reasons, 
among them the diffi culty of determining the useful life of many gov-
ernment purchases, government accountants have adopted the simple 
cash accounting framework. 
Consistent with cash accounting, OMB Circular A-11 instructs 
government accountants to “treat an investment in non-U.S. securi-
ties (equity or debt securities) as a purchase of an asset, recording an 
obligation and an outlay in an amount equal to the purchase price in 
the year of the purchase” (OMB 2012, p. 2 of Section 113). Accord-
ing to this procedure, the purchase of private securities for the Rail-
road Retirement program would be booked as current government 
expenditure. 
Government accounting also would not offset this outlay with the 
sale of Treasuries of equivalent value. OMB Circular A-11 instructs 
government agencies to treat Treasuries as equivalent to cash, and 
the purchase or sale of Treasuries “as a change in the mix of asset 
holdings rather than as a purchase or sale of assets” (OMB 2012, 
p. 3 of Section 113). Buying private securities is an expenditure; sell-
ing Treasuries is a nonevent. Assuming the Railroad Retirement Trust 
would retain about 20 percent of its assets in Treasuries and use the 
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proceeds from the sale of the remainder to purchase private securities, 
the CBO came up with its $15.3 billion expenditure fi gure. 
Whatever the rationale for cash-basis accounting for general 
government operations, it made little sense for a pension plan. Gov-
ernment accounting prior to 1969 had in fact separated the accounts 
of Social Security from the rest of the budget. The fi nances of Social 
Security are still addressed independently of the accounts of general 
government operations in the annual Social Security Trustees Report. 
Since 1969, however, government accounting included Social Secu-
rity in the federal unifi ed budget and reported its operations, as part of 
the government’s unifi ed operations, on a cash accounting basis. For 
decades government accounting thus reported Social Security run-
ning surpluses—while the actuarial projections in the trustees’ reports 
showed increasingly serious fi nancial trouble. 
The railroad team negotiating with Congress recognized the polit-
ical impediment this accounting treatment created. As it turned out, 
cash accounting was not universally applied in government account-
ing. In the Credit Reform Act of 1990, Congress specifi ed by statute 
that direct student and home loans be treated as a means of fi nancing, 
so extending such loans (i.e., buying such loans) would not be rec-
ognized as a current budgetary outlay. The railroad team succeeded 
in getting similar treatment for Railroad Retirement investments in 
private securities. To prevent the sale of Treasuries and purchase of 
private securities from creating a budgetary defi cit—an accounting 
illusion that disguised what in effect was an exchange of assets of 
equal value—the 2001 legislation specifi ed that purchases of private 
securities by the Railroad Retirement program be scored as a neutral 
“means of fi nancing” (Salmon 2013).2   
With the treatment of securities purchases settled by statute, the 
CBO and OMB specifi ed the reporting of annual investment income. 
The budgetary offi ces required interest, dividends, rents, and realized 
and unrealized capital gains be recorded as government revenue—or 
a government outlay should capital losses exceed interest, dividend, 
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and rental income. These amounts, however, were not expected to 
signifi cantly affect the government’s reported defi cit (or surplus). 
MEETING THE CHALLENGE: FINANCIAL AND 
POLITICAL RISKS IN EQUITY INVESTMENT
The primary concerns of Congress were the fi nancial and polit-
ical risks in equity investment. Because stocks are far riskier than 
bonds, investing Railroad Retirement assets in equities raised the 
prospect of large, unexpected changes in the program’s fi nances. The 
proposal that the reformers brought to Congress, however, included 
the automatic adjustment ratchet that raised and lowered payroll taxes 
in response to such shocks. The inclusion of this automatic adjust-
ment mechanism was critical in easing concerns about investing 
Railroad Retirement assets in equities. It also allowed Congress to 
distance itself from resetting Railroad Retirement taxes and benefi ts 
in response to future shocks, which had been a poor use of congres-
sional time and resources. 
The major concern of Congress, however, was the risk of politi-
cal infl uence on investment decisions. The major changes it made to 
the industry plan thus addressed that risk. To minimize the risk of 
political infl uence, Congress removed the government as much as 
possible from the management of Railroad Retirement assets. Thus 
the industry had proposed a nine-person board of trustees to man-
age those assets, with three trustees selected by the carriers, three 
by labor, and the other three being the three members of the Rail-
road Retirement Board. Congress removed the three Railroad Retire-
ment Board representatives, as the Board was a government agency. 
The fi nal statute specifi cally stated that “no member of the Railroad 
Retirement Board shall be eligible to be a member of the Board of 
Trustees.” The organizations representing labor and management, as 
specifi ed in the Railway Labor Act, would select the six private sector 
trustees. Then they, not the government, would select a single “inde-
pendent” (not “public”) trustee.3  
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Congress also created a new entity to hold and manage Railroad 
Retirement assets—the National Railroad Retirement Investment 
Trust (NRRIT)—and moved it out of the government. The statute 
clearly stated that the NRRIT “is not a department, agency, or instru-
mentality of the Government of the United States.” Congress also 
named the NRRIT a “trust” to more closely track the structure of pri-
vate sector pension trusts and “make the investment aspects of the 
proposal suffi ciently ‘less governmental.’”4  
Private sector pension trusts themselves had problems with 
“political infl uence” on investment decisions—with the plan’s com-
pany or union sponsors, or executives within those entities, investing 
pension assets in ways that advanced their interests, not the inter-
ests of the plan participants. A major contribution of ERISA was to 
impose strict new fi duciary standards on the sponsors and managers 
of private pension plans. Congress now borrowed freely from ERISA 
to impose similar requirements on the NRRIT. The Railroad Retire-
ment and Survivors’ Improvement Act (RRSIA) required the new 
Investment Trust to act “solely in the interest of the Railroad Retire-
ment Board and through it, the participants and benefi ciaries of the 
programs funded under this Act.” This language specifi cally forbade 
any other objective, such as advancing the interests of the carriers 
or unions—interests ERISA sought to exclude. It also prohibited the 
advancement of other social or economic goals, as often found in the 
mandates of other “public” pension programs (ERISA 1974, Section 
404(a); Mercer 2011; RRSIA 2001, Section 105(a); Sass 1997; U.S. 
House of Appropriations Committee 2007, pp. 9–10.)
Also borrowing from ERISA, Congress required competent 
investment management. It couldn’t mandate investment success. But 
it did require trustees with professional qualifi cations—with “experi-
ence and expertise in the management of fi nancial investments and 
pension plans”—to invest Railroad Retirement assets with “care, 
skill, prudence, and diligence” (the ERISA “prudent man” standard), 
and to diversify asset holdings “so as to minimize risk of large losses” 
and “avoid disproportionate infl uence over a particular industry or 
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fi rm”—a potentially politically problematic infl uence (RRSIA 2001, 
Sections 105(j) 3(B); 105(j)(5)(A)(ii); and 105(j)(5)(A)(iii)). 
While Congress created the NRRIT as much as it could in the 
image of a private pension trust, Railroad Retirement remained a gov-
ernment program and its assets government assets. So Congress also 
constructed a system of government oversight. The statute required 
an annual audit by an independent auditor. It also required an annual 
report, sent to Congress, the president, the Railroad Retirement 
Board, and the OMB, on the Trust’s fi nancial position, cash fl ows, 
internal accounting and control systems, and “any other comments 
and information necessary to inform Congress about the operations 
and fi nancial condition of the Trust.” A memorandum of understand-
ing between the Trust and the Railroad Retirement Board, the Trea-
sury, and the OMB would also require monthly reports of gains and 
losses, sales and purchases, receipts and disbursements, and admin-
istrative expenses. If something was amiss, Congress authorized the 
Railroad Retirement Board to go to court “to enjoin any act or prac-
tice by the Trust, its Board of Trustees, or its employees or agents that 
violates any provision of this Act” or “(ii) to obtain other appropriate 
relief to redress such violations, or to enforce any provisions of this 
Act.” This oversight of the Investment Trust supplemented the exist-
ing reports on the fi nancial status of the Railroad Retirement program 
produced by the Railroad Retirement Actuary—the annual “Section 
502” report providing fi ve-year projections of the program’s fi nances 
and the triennial actuarial valuations that provided projections over a 
75-year horizon (RRSIA 2001, Section 105(j)(5)(E); Section 105(j)
(5)(F); Section 108(b)).5   
ENACTMENT
Despite these refi nements, key Republican leaders remained 
opposed to the investment of Railroad Retirement assets in equities. 
With an eye on Social Security, they saw the stakes as enormously 
high. Others in Congress, in both parties, were more attuned to the 
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unifi ed support for reform from rail labor and management. Union 
and carrier representatives made joint visits to key congressmen and 
senators. According to Joel Parker, a lead labor negotiator, the unions 
organized “one of the biggest lobbying efforts by the rank and fi le in 
labor history,” with members receiving a steady stream of communi-
cations promoting the virtues of reform, with mailers they could send 
to their congressmen and senators. Given the popularity of 60/30 and 
enhanced widow(er)’s benefi ts, it did not take much to motivate the 
rank and fi le.6  
The House passed legislation in September 2000 for what would 
become the RRSIA in 2001. But the Republican leadership, which 
controlled the Senate, was able to block the bill. The House passed 
essentially the same legislation in 2001 by a vote of 384 for and 33 
against, and the Senate leadership again blocked the bill. 
What broke the logjam was the decision by Senator James Jef-
fords of Vermont to quit the Republican Party, become an indepen-
dent, and caucus with the Democrats. That gave Democrats control 
of the Senate and its schedule, which allowed the bill to come to 
the fl oor for a vote. The key vote was the vote to end a fi libuster by 
Republican leaders, widely understood as a vote on the legislation 
itself. Voting yes was politically expedient, as it made rail workers, 
retirees, and rail management happy. Once passage seemed assured, 
even many Republican senators voted to end the fi libuster. Reform 
was then enacted with overwhelming support: 90 votes for and 9 
against. President Bush, unwilling to veto this clear “will of Con-
gress,” signed the RRSIA into law on December 21, 2001 (NRRIT 
2002 Annual Report; see Salmon [2013, Note 60], for an insightful 
narration of the enactment process).
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Notes
 1. It should be noted that not all Republicans opposed the legislation. Bud 
Shuster (R-PA) and Don Young (R-AK), two senior House Republicans, 
supported the bill on pragmatic grounds, believing the reforms would 
improve the system. Without their support, the bill would not have been 
passed by the House of Representatives in 2000 or 2001.
 2. The CBO (2003, p. 12) called this treatment “a signifi cant departure” 
from traditional government accounting. 
 3. In 2000, the House of Representatives modifi ed the original labor-
management proposal to remove the three members of the Railroad 
Retirement Board as Trustees but left the Railroad Retirement Board 
with the responsibility to appoint all seven trustees (Congressional 
Record 2000). In 2001, the House of Representatives went further to 
address continuing concerns about the government retaining any role 
in the investment activities of the NRRIT, particularly within the Bush 
Administration, and transferred the power to appoint all seven Trust-
ees from the Railroad Retirement Board to the industry. Section 105(j)
(3) thus specifi ed that organizations employing and representing at 
least two-thirds of all active workers covered by the Railway Labor Act 
select the NRRIT’s management and labor trustees (RRSIA 2001, Sec-
tion 105(j)(3)).
 4. Section 105(a); Salmon (2013, pp. 65, 71); Congress reaffi rmed the 
Trust’s status as a nongovernmental entity when the Railroad Retire-
ment Board’s Inspector General wanted to audit the Trust’s operational 
procedures, considered “best practice” in government audits. In reject-
ing that request, Congress cited its desire that “the Trust functions inde-
pendently from the Railroad Retirement Board.”
 5. The memorandum of understanding also outlined procedures for trans-
ferring assets between the Treasury and the Trust. 
 6. Interview with Joel Parker, January 29, 2012; Salmon (2013, pp. 62ff). 
Sass.indb   38 12/10/2014   10:26:37 AM
39
Chapter 4
An Assessment to Date 
of the Reformed Railroad 
Retirement Program
The Railroad Retirement and Survivors’ Improvement Act of 2001 
made four key changes in the Railroad Retirement program: it raised 
benefi ts, cut taxes, and introduced two major institutional innovations. 
The fi rst such institutional innovation was the creation of the NRRIT 
to invest Railroad Retirement assets in equities and other private-
sector securities. The second was the creation of an automatic tax 
adjustment mechanism, the Railroad Retirement ratchet, to keep the 
program’s fi nances on track. This chapter will assess the performance 
of these two institutional innovations over their fi rst dozen years in 
existence. The next chapter will assess the effect on rail workers and 
carriers of the increase in benefi ts, cut in taxes, and prospect of higher 
taxes down the road. 
When enacting the RRSIA, Congress was primarily concerned 
with the governance of Railroad Retirement assets and risk of politi-
cal infl uence on investment decisions. This chapter will thus begin 
with a review of the creation of the NRRIT and its governance of 
Railroad Retirement assets. It will then review the ability of the tax 
adjustment ratchet to keep the program on track—an unusually chal-
lenging task given the increase in benefi ts, reduction in taxes, and 
fi nancial turbulence over the fi rst dozen years of reform. 
CREATING THE GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE
Congress charged the rail industry to set up and run the NRRIT 
much like a standard private sector pension trust, which the industry 
was well equipped to do. Creating the governance structure of a mod-
ern pension trust is no simple task. It would take eight months to get 
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the Trust up and running and several more years to fully staff up and 
defi ne and execute the Trust’s investment program, but the roadmap 
was understood. 
Congress had set February 1, 2002, as the date the Trust could 
be created. So between December 21, when President Bush signed 
the RRSIA into law, and February 1, the rail management and labor 
organizations selected their trustees. The three carrier trustees were 
Thomas N. Hund, James A. Hixon, and Bernie Gutschewski; the three 
from labor were Joel Parker, Daniel E. Johnson III, and George J. 
Francisco, Jr.1 When they met on February 1, the six trustees adopted 
a set of bylaws; secured the necessary insurances and bonding; 
selected Parker as chair; set up investment, administration, and audit 
committees; and selected Dewey Ballantine LLP (outside counsel to 
the Union Pacifi c) and Guerrieri, Edmond, and Clayman PC (a fi rm 
close to labor) as Trust co-counsels. Hixon, Gutschewski, Parker, 
and John Salmon, of Dewey Ballantine, were leading players in the 
negotiations creating the industry reform proposal and in the lobbying 
effort to win congressional passage. 
The trustees then went to work to create a modern “institutional” 
investment organization. They met with senior investment managers 
in major corporate and multiemployer pension trusts for guidance 
and advice. They conducted nationwide searches that resulted in the 
selection of John W. MacMurray, a seasoned pension executive, as 
the NRRIT’s “independent” trustee, Northern Trust as Trust Cus-
todian, and Enos T. Throop as chief investment offi cer.2 Following 
directives in the statute, the trustees developed compensation pack-
ages for Throop and other Trust employees “necessary for the proper 
administration” of the Trust’s activities. Congress explicitly included 
this requirement because the terms and conditions of employment in 
the investment management industry were quite different from those 
offered to public sector workers, and the Trust needed to offer com-
petitive terms and conditions to attract and retain effective investment 
managers. Also following the RRSIA directives, the trustees retained 
“independent advisers to assist it in the formulation and adoption of 
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its investment guidelines,” commissioning an asset-liability study 
from Watson Wyatt that was fi nalized in August. They then retained 
independent investment managers to invest the assets of the Trust in 
a manner consistent with such investment guidelines, selecting Bar-
clays Global Investors in September as the Trust’s fi rst investment 
manager. Barclays managed passive stock and bond index funds, 
which is where the trustees placed their fi rst investments. As the Trust 
staffed up and developed greater managerial capacity, it would move 
the bulk of its assets to active external investment managers. But the 
Trust was now ready—eight months after its creation—to manage 
the assets of the Railroad Retirement program (RRSIA 2001, Section 
105(j)(4); Section 105(j)(6); NRRIT 2002). 
Consistent with the intent of Congress, the trustees created added 
safeguards against political infl uences on investment decisions. 
ERISA allowed pension trusts to invest up to 10 percent of their assets 
in the sponsor’s securities. As the language in the RRSIA seemed to 
frown on such investments, the trustees agreed not to invest any Rail-
road Retirement assets in securities issued by North American rail-
roads. The pension fund would not be, and would not be seen, as a 
captive source of credit for the industry, or any fi rm in the industry. 
The trustees also decided to restrict active investment managers to 
oversee at most 10 percent of Trust assets. While the primary purpose 
was to promote diversifi cation, the policy would also limit any per-
ceived infl uence on the broader U.S. economy. Finally, the trustees 
adopted institutional investor best practice for voting proxies. It del-
egated proxy voting to the Trust’s external investment managers with 
the mandate that “all proxies shall be voted solely in the interest of 
plan participants and benefi ciaries” (NRRIT 2002).3
The board politics were also conducive to effective trust fund 
management. Unlike standard multiemployer pension plans, which 
had one dominant union and many small employer representatives, 
the NRRIT board had a much more balanced power structure, with 
the four large Class I Railroads that dominated the industry after the 
mergers of the 1990s essentially naming the three management trust-
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ees and 12 unions, represented by the Cooperating Railway Labor 
Organizations, naming the three labor trustees. Various trustees report 
a high degree of comity, with essentially no disagreements between 
management and labor, and the trustees making decisions in an effi -
cient, businesslike manner. A contributing factor could be joint man-
agement-labor effort in winning congressional approval of the 2001 
reform. Another could be the distribution of risk. The carriers bore 
all the downside risk. The tax adjustment mechanism that the RRSIA 
introduced would raise the carriers’ payroll tax, not the workers’ pay-
roll tax, if the fi nances of the program weakened beyond specifi ed 
benchmarks. As the carriers were also far more willing and able than 
labor to bear that downside risk, this removed a potential area of con-
fl ict between management and labor trustees. Whatever the reason, 
the board, by all reports, was generally united in reaching its invest-
ment and managerial decisions. 
INVESTMENT GOVERNANCE TO DATE
The Trust began receiving Railroad Retirement assets in Septem-
ber 2002, once its basic investment infrastructure was in place. By 
the end of March 2003, the transfer was largely complete. As it turned 
out, this was a remarkably fortuitous time for the Railroad Retirement 
program to sell bonds and buy stock (NRRIT 2006). 
The shift in Railroad Retirement investments from government 
bonds to private sector securities came just after the 2001 recession 
had ended. The market interest rate on intermediate-term Treasuries, 
which the Railroad Retirement program held, had fallen precipitously 
(Figure 4.1). The program’s bonds thus had an above-market yield 
and produced a substantial capital gain when sold. The funds were 
transferred to the NRRIT—$21.3 billion by the end of the fi rst quarter 
of 2003—and invested in Barclay stock and bond index funds. Stock 
prices had also fallen sharply, then increased smartly: by the end of 
the 2003 fi scal year, NRRIT assets produced annualized returns of 
nearly 20 percent (NRRIT 2002). 
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The RRSIA had established the “account benefi ts ratio”—the 
ratio of the market value of Railroad Retirement assets to annual ben-
efi t outlays—as the basic yardstick for measuring the fi nancial health 
of the program, with the trailing 10-year average of that ratio deter-
mining Railroad Retirement tax rates. Despite the sweetened benefi ts 
and lower taxes the 2001 reform introduced, the capital gains on the 
sale of the program’s bonds and the returns achieved on trust fund 
investments pushed the account benefi ts ratio, which had been about 
4.5 times annual outlays in 1999, to 6.6 times annual outlays by the 
end of the 2003 fi scal year (NRRIT 2003). 
The interest rate decline that produced the capital gain on Rail-
road Retirement bonds and boosted the program’s account benefi ts 
ratio—the yardstick used to measure the health of the program—had 
a very different effect on the “funded ratio” of private defi ned ben-
efi t pension plans—the yardstick used to measure the health of such 
plans. The funded ratio is the ratio of trust fund assets to the present 
Figure 4.1  Market Interest Rate, Intermediate-Term Government 
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value of plan obligations. It reports whether the plan has suffi cient 
assets in hand to meet those obligations. The obligations of a pension 
plan stretch far into the future and by statute must be valued using 
current interest rates on high-quality corporate bonds. Just as the 
decline in interest rates raised the value of Treasuries held by the Rail-
road Retirement system, it raised the present value of private pension 
obligations. The interest rate decline was in fact the main contributor 
to the dramatic fall in the funded ratios of private plans in the early 
2000s. Congress, concerned that plan sponsors and their plans could 
go bust and transfer large unfunded obligations to the government’s 
Pension Benefi t Guaranty Corporation, had over time required spon-
sors to rapidly eliminate shortfalls when the shortfalls grew beyond 
specifi ed levels. These rules resulted in contributions tripling in the 
recession at the turn of the century and were a major factor in spon-
sor decisions to terminate, freeze, or otherwise abandon their defi ned 
benefi t pension programs (Munnell and Sass 2006). 
Government-run social insurance programs do not have the same 
bankruptcy risks as private defi ned benefi t plans. Thus the funded 
ratio, which uses the present value of plan obligations as the yardstick 
for assessing the adequacy of pension plan assets, is far less useful for 
assessing the health of such programs. Railroad Retirement, however 
anomalous, is a government-run social insurance program. It might 
be argued that the interest rate decline should trigger a reduction in 
the expected return on Trust assets, which could require an offsetting 
increase in Railroad Retirement payroll taxes. But no such relation-
ship was present in the RRSIA’s tax adjustment ratchet, which based 
payroll taxes solely on the ratio of assets to annual benefi t payments. 
Whatever the implications of the decline in interest rates on 
expected returns, the returns on stocks the Trust bought in 2002–2003 
were remarkably good. The promise of higher returns on equities 
had been the primary factor driving management and labor to reform 
the Railroad Retirement program. And the gains from investing in 
stocks—up until the Crash of 2008—exceeded all expectations (Fig-
ure 4.2).
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Determining the share of trust fund assets to invest in stocks, 
and which type of stocks; how much to invest in bonds, and which 
type of bonds; and how much to invest in other types of assets, such 
as real estate and private equity, is a diffi cult issue. The fundamental 
objective of any pension trust is to provide the cash the plan needs, 
when it needs it, to pay promised benefi ts. The gain that the 2001 
reform divided between management and labor—like the gain that 
management and labor divide in private pension plans—involved 
investments in equities and taking on risk. So the trustees, “in accor-
dance with statutory directives,” defi ned its two “principal objectives: 
1) to ensure the timely and certain payments of benefi ts to eligible 
railroad retirement plan participants and benefi ciaries, and 2) to 
achieve a long term rate-of-return on assets suffi cient to enhance the 
fi nancial strength of the Railroad Retirement System.” The prudence 
and diversifi cation the RRSIA required could enhance the certainty 
of benefi t payments and reduce other fi nancial risks—but only so far 
Figure 4.2  Real Value of a Portfolio of Large Company Stocks Index, 
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without also reducing expected returns. So setting the Trust’s “Invest-
ment Guidelines”—its mix of assets and how much and what type of 
risks to take on—was the fundamental decision the Trustees had to 
make (NRRIT 2002). 
The RRSIA clearly stated that the Trustees “shall . . . retain inde-
pendent advisers to assist it in the formulation and adoption of its 
investment guidelines,” which had to be approved by “a unanimous 
vote of the entire Board of Trustees” (Section 105(j)(4)(A); Section 
105(j)(7)). The Board retained Watson Wyatt to produce an asset-
liability study that recommended a strategy, which the trustees unani-
mously adopted (Table 4.1). 
The guidelines gave the trustees some fl exibility to alter asset 
allocations in response to market conditions, but they limited the 
range of deviation. As changes in the price of stocks and bonds shift 
the value of assets invested in each class, the Trust rebalances on a 
quarterly basis: It sells assets above their target allocation to provide 
any additional cash the plan needed to pay benefi ts, or to buy assets 
below their allocation target. 
The Watson Wyatt guidelines were relatively aggressive. High-
yield bonds have relatively high expected returns and risk—a fi nan-
cial profi le much like equities. So the guidelines allocated 70 percent 
of trust fund assets to investments with high expected returns and 
risk and 30 percent to investment grade bonds, securities with rela-
tively low expected returns and risk. International and private equity 
Table 4.1  Target Asset Allocation Strategy
Asset class Policy target (%) Target range (%)
Equity 65 60–70
Domestic (U.S.) equities 40 34–46
International equities 20 17–23
Private equity 5 3–7
Fixed income (including cash) 35 30–40
Investment grade bonds 30 25–35
High-yield bonds 5 3–7
SOURCE: NRRIT Annual Report (2003).
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and high-yield bonds have different risks than domestic equities, 
the primary risk asset held by the Trust. So the allocation dampened 
the expected volatility of trust fund returns. The trustees would add 
new asset classes, such as overseas bonds, real estate, commodities, 
“opportunistic” hedge funds, and cash; they would also set alloca-
tions and performance benchmarks for fi ner classifi cations within 
these asset classes. But the allocation remained relatively aggressive. 
As shown in Figure 4.3, the NRRIT achieved returns that “gener-
ally compared favorably” to its benchmarks—indexes used to evalu-
ate the performance of investment managers. But as the fi gure shows, 
the Trust’s strategic investment allocation and the performance of the 
fi nancial markets have been far more important than its own tactical 
performance vis-à-vis its benchmarks. The Trust’s investment strat-
egy produced returns well above expectations through fi scal 2007, 
but returns over the next four years, through the crash of 2008 and 
the Great Recession that followed, were far worse than anyone could 
SOURCE: Szymendera (2011) using data from NRRIT Annual Reports.
Figure 4.3  NRRIT Returns vis-à-vis Policy Benchmarks
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have expected. 
The crash also sparked a scramble for liquidity as the fi nancial 
markets froze. The Railroad Retirement program was quite depen-
dent on transfers from the NRRIT to pay benefi ts. The 2001 benefi t 
increases and tax cuts, and further cuts produced by the tax adjust-
ment ratchet in response to the dramatic rise in trust fund assets and 
the program’s account benefi ts ratio, had created a substantial gap 
between annual benefi t outlays and incoming tax receipts. The payroll 
tax and income taxes on benefi ts, which were returned to the Rail-
road Retirement program, covered just 70 percent of outlays in 2008. 
Transfers from the NRRIT were needed to cover the remaining 30 
percent. The experience of the 2008 fi nancial crisis and the Railroad 
Retirement program’s dependence on transfers from the Trust led the 
NRRIT to bulk up in cash until the markets returned to more normal 
conditions. It also created additional liquidity by eliminating securi-
ties lending, which trimmed returns by a negligible few basis points. 
But investment policy was otherwise little changed. The 2011 guide-
lines of major asset classes, with the performance benchmarks for 
each, are presented in Table 4.2. The allocation remained relatively 
aggressive, with increased diversifi cation somewhat dampening the 
expected volatility of trust fund returns.4
Investment returns through the end of fi scal 2011, though below 
expectations at the beginning of the decade, were nonetheless suf-
fi cient to help produce an account benefi ts ratio of 4.75 times annual 
outlays for 2012, somewhat above the 4.62 ratio for 2012 projected 
at the beginning of reform (Railroad Retirement Board 2003, 2014, 
using employment projection 1). By this measure, the creation of the 
NRRIT has thus far proved a success. 
THE PERFORMANCE OF RAILROAD 
RETIREMENT RATCHET 
 The 2001 reform raised benefi ts, cut taxes, created the NRRIT to 
invest Railroad Retirement assets in equities, and introduced the tax 
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adjustment ratchet to keep the program’s fi nances on track. The tax 
cuts, benefi t increases, and early retirements fi nanced by the benefi t 
increases, which reduced payroll tax revenues, all weakened the sys-
tem’s fi nances. These effects were expected (Figure 4.4). The CBO 
estimated the cost of these changes at $7 billion over the fi rst 10 years 
following the enactment of reform. The higher expected returns on 
trust fund assets and the tax adjustment ratchet were designed to see 
that Railroad Retirement benefi ts were nonetheless paid. 
The tax adjustment ratchet set the payroll tax rate based on a 
10-year trailing average of the ratio of assets to annual outlays (Figure 
Table 4.2  NRRIT 2011 Investment Guidelines
Asset class Policy benchmark
Target 
allocation 
(%)
Policy 
range (%)
U.S. equity Russell 3000 23.0 18–28
Non-U.S. equity MSCI ACWI Ex-US IMI-
$Net
21.0 16–26
Private equity 2/3 Russell 3000 + MSCI 
ACWI Ex-US IMI-$Net + 
300 bp
10.0 2–15
Global equity 54.0 45–61
U.S. fi xed income Barclays U.S. Universal 13.5 9–18
Non-U.S.fi xed income Barclays Global Aggregate 
ex-USD
8.5 5–15
Global fi xed income 22.0 18–28
Real estate 80% NCREIF Property 
Index + 20% Custom REITa
10.0 2–15
Commodities DJ-UBS Total Return 5.0 2–8
Global real assets 15.0 10–20
Absolute return NRRIT Public Markets 
Composite
8.0 2–10
Cash BofA ML 3-Month T-Bill 1.0 0–3
Other 9.0 2–12
Total fund 100.0
a NRRIT’s Custom REIT benchmark is 2/3 “FTSE NAREIT index” and 1/3 “FTSE 
EPR/NAREIT Global Real Estate Index – Net Return to U.S. Investors.”
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4.5). It cut taxes when that ratio rose above six and raised taxes when 
it fell below four. The ratchet went into effect as the unexpectedly 
strong returns on trust fund assets, through 2007, pushed the value of 
Railroad Retirement assets to just below eight times annual outlays, 
and the trailing 10-year average ratio to just below seven times annual 
Figure 4.4  Projected Tax Income and Benefi t Outlays, Pre- and 
Postreform ($ billions)
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outlays (Figure 4.6). As the 10-year average ratio rose above the tar-
get band of four-to-six-times outlays, it triggered tax reductions that 
cut the payroll tax from 18 to 16 percent of covered earnings (Figure 
4.7)—an 11 percent reduction.  
The unexpected tax cuts arrived as the “watermelon entered the 
snake”—as the gap between benefi t outlays and tax receipts widened 
and had to be fi lled with large transfers from Trust assets. The system 
needed $1.3 billion from the Trust to pay promised benefi ts in fi scal 
2008—31 percent of that year’s benefi t outlays. This was 4 percent 
of Trust assets of $32.7 billion at the beginning of the fi scal year. But 
then the market crashed, and the value of Trust assets fell 19 percent 
in fi scal 2008 (Table 4.3). After transferring the $1.3 billion, the value 
of assets in the Trust assets fell 23 percent, from $32.7 to $25.3 bil-
lion—from 7.9 to 6.1 times annual benefi t outlays—by the end of 
fi scal 2008 (Figure 4.8).  
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Figure 4.5  The Railroad Retirement Tax Adjustment Ratchet
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Average Ratio of Assets to Annual Outlays
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Figure 4.6   Railroad Retirement Account Benefi ts Ratios, 
2011–2013 
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Figure 4.7  Railroad Retirement Payroll Tax Rates, 2001–2014 
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From 2009 through 2012, assets in the National Railroad Retire-
ment Investment Trust earned, on average, 6.7 percent.5 But because 
of rising benefi t costs and the payroll tax remaining 2 percentage 
points below its benchmark 18 percent rate, the trust fund had to 
provide between 36 and 44 percent of Railroad Retirement outlays. 
Transfers over these four years, on average, were 7.7 percent of 
Railroad Retirement assets. Because transfers exceeded investment 
earnings, the value of Railroad Retirement assets declined nearly 7 
percent from 2008 to 2012 (Table 4.3). And because annual outlays 
continued to rise, the ratio of assets to outlays slipped from 6.1 in 
2008 to 4.9 in 2012. 
Despite this weakening in the system’s fi nances since the crash 
of 2008, payroll tax rates remained unchanged at 16 percent of cov-
ered earnings. The Railroad Retirement ratchet adjusts tax rates based 
on the average account-benefi ts ratio over the preceding 10 years.6 
As shown in Figure 4.7, that average trended down slowly and only 
crossed the 6.5 threshold at the end of fi scal year 2012, triggering a 6 
percent increase in the payroll tax to 17 percent of covered earnings 
Table 4.3  Railroad Retirement Asset Returns, Transfers to Pay Benefi ts, 
and Returns-Transfers
Investment 
returns Transfers
Returns-
transfers
As % of 
initial assets
As % of 
benefi ts
As % of 
initial assets
As % of 
initial assets
2004 13.0 43 7.0 6.9
2005 14.0 22 3.2 10.8
2006 9.8 25 3.2 6.6
2007 16.4 34 4.8 11.6
2008 −19.1 31 4.0 −23.1
2009 −0.7 36 6.3 −7.0
2010 11.2 44 8.6 2.6
2011 −0.1 38 7.1 −7.2
2012 16.4 42 8.6 7.8
SOURCE: NRRIT Annual Reports. 25th actuarial valuation. Table A2.—Status of the 
Railroad Retirement accounts and trust funds, by fi scal year, 2003–2012; Author’s 
calculations.
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in calendar year 2013. The tax will likely rise another 6 percent, to 18 
percent of covered earnings, in calendar year 2015. Only then, seven 
years after the crash of 2008, will the tax return to its benchmark 18 
percent rate. 
What strengthened the system during this period was the unex-
pected stability of railroad employment. Rail employment had 
declined dramatically over the entire post–World War II era, and 
falling employment is the worst of all possible environments for 
pay-as-you-go retirement programs. Rail employment is expected 
to continue to decline, with the debate in projecting the fi nances of 
the Railroad Retirement program on how steep the decline would be. 
Despite the increased retirements that came in response to the 2001 
reform—which allowed workers with 30 years of service to retire on 
full benefi ts at age 60, not 62—rail employment remained remark-
ably strong. Rail employment at the end of 2010 was even greater 
than the optimistic projection of the prereform Actuarial Valuation 
Figure 4.8  Railroad Retirement Assets, 2003–2012 ($ billions)
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(Figure 4.9). This stronger than anticipated employment performance 
produced unexpectedly strong payroll tax receipts and reduced the 
need for Trust transfers to pay benefi ts; it also helped offset the lack-
luster performance of the fi nancial markets after the 2008 crash and 
the delayed response of the ratchet to the program’s falling ratio of 
assets to outlays. 
AN ASSESSMENT TO DATE
The primary concern of Congress in enacting the reform was the 
risk of political infl uence on the investment decisions. A secondary 
concern was the fi nancial performance of the redesigned program. 
In terms of the governance of Railroad Retirement assets, a lead-
ing observer identifi ed a set of good practices not commonly observed 
in public fund management: 
Figure 4.9  Actual Railroad Employment Compared to Various 
Assumptions of 21st Actuarial Valuation
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(i) explicit funding targets and mechanisms to trigger action 
in the case of deviation from this objective; (ii) commercial 
investment policies fl owing from these targets and explicitly 
aimed at maximizing risk-adjusted returns for members; (iii) 
professional boards selected through a process that maintains 
an “arms-length” relationship with government offi cials; (iv) 
prohibition on social investment criteria or ETIs [economically 
targeted investments]; (v) signifi cant share of investment done 
through external managers selected and retained by explicit 
and objective criteria; (vi) avoidance of strict portfolio limits, 
especially on foreign investments and (vii) high standards of 
reporting and disclosure including annual, independent audits, 
performance reviews, and codes of conduct for Board members 
available to the public. (Palacios 2002, p. 40)  
By these criteria, the NRRIT is an exemplary manager of public pen-
sion assets. 
A recent review of the NRRIT governance structure likewise 
concluded that thus far “the NRRIT appears to have achieved the 
political independence Congress desired” (Whitman 2011, p. 81). 
That review cited fi ve contributing factors: 1) the Trust’s legal sta-
tus as an independent nongovernment entity; 2) the ERISA-based 
“mandate” to invest Railroad Retirement assets prudently and solely 
in the interest of the plan and plan participants; 3) the “professional” 
character of NRRIT trustees, who represent both management and 
labor; 4) the professional development of investment guidelines and 
benchmarks, primarily carried out by external investment managers; 
and 5) an effective system of fi nancial reporting and oversight (also 
see GAO 2014).  
The basic explanation of this success is that all parties—Con-
gress, carriers, and unions—wanted NRRIT to function like a modern 
private pension trust. The governance of such trusts has been well 
developed under ERISA mandates and decades of experience to act as 
Congress intended—solely in the interests of the plan and its partici-
pants, using transparent and sophisticated investment management 
practices. 
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Of more concern is the fi nancial design of the reformed Rail-
road Retirement program. The reformers had far less precedent upon 
which to build the new design and selected key parameters in a some-
what ad hoc manner. The ratchet raised taxes above the benchmark 18 
percent rate when assets fell below four times benefi t outlays because 
that was the ratio of assets to outlays when they designed the reform, 
and having assets equal to four times benefi t outlays was historically 
high in the program’s experience. The decision to use a 10-year aver-
age ratio of assets to outlays as the basis for setting the tax rate was 
chosen to dampen shocks on carrier cash fl ows and reduce the volatil-
ity of employee tax rates. The performance of the fi nancial markets in 
the fi rst decade of reform—admittedly a historically volatile period—
illustrates the limits of the ratchet’s ability to stabilize the program’s 
fi nances. Were it not for the unexpected strength in railroad employ-
ment, the program’s fi nances would have been in much worse shape. 
 
Notes
 1. Thomas N. Hund was executive vice president and chief fi nancial offi -
cer of Burlington Northern-Santa Fe; James A. Hixon was senior vice 
president–administration of Norfolk Southern; and Bernie Gutschewski 
was vice president–taxes, for Union Pacifi c. Joel Parker was interna-
tional vice president, Transportation Communications Union; Daniel 
E. Johnson, III, was secretary–treasurer of the United Transportation 
Union; and George J. Francisco, Jr., was president of the National Con-
ference of Firemen and Oilers.
 2. When hired, Throop was the director of investments of the UMWA 
Funds and had more than 25 years of investment management experi-
ence working for plan sponsors.
 3. The trustees drew up a list of 10 North American railroad companies, 
later expanded, whose securities the Trust would not purchase. Their 
securities could only be held indirectly within of a passive index fund. 
 4. The 2008 Annual Report of the NRRIT characterized the allocation as 
“a structure which is more fully diversifi ed across geography, capitaliza-
tion size, style, credit quality and many other characteristics” (p. 16) and 
“addresses asset allocation across a spectrum of active risk levels and 
degrees of liquidity” (p. 17).
 5. The arithmetic average. The geometric average was 6.2 percent. 
 6. Rounded up to the nearest tenth.
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Chapter 5 
The Reform’s Effect 
on Workers and Carriers
The 2001 reform of the Railroad Retirement program had a sig-
nifi cant effect on the lives of rail workers and the fi nances of their 
employers. The labor and management negotiators had agreed to 
divide the gains of reform 50-50, with the workers getting higher ben-
efi ts and the carriers a payroll tax cut. The carriers also agreed that 
they would pay higher taxes down the road, up to 22.1 percent of pay-
roll, should the program’s fi nances unwind as the watermelon passed 
through the snake. The negotiators also agreed that should fi nancial 
pressures on the program thereafter subside, the carriers’ tax could 
fall sharply, and the tax on workers could even vanish. 
WORKERS AND THE 2001 REFORM
Labor took their portion of the gains of reform by increasing ben-
efi ts in three different ways. Beginning January 1, 2002, the program 
1) vested workers with rights to benefi ts after fewer years of service, 
2) increased benefi ts paid to survivors, and 3) allowed workers with 
30 years of service to retire on full benefi ts at 60 rather than 62. 
Prior to the 2001 reform, rail workers earned a vested right to 
Railroad Retirement benefi ts after 10 years of service—only after 10 
years of service would they receive any benefi ts from the program. 
Ten-year vesting was one of three minimum vesting rules ERISA 
required in private sector plans, and it became the vesting rule most 
private plans had adopted. Congress changed that rule to require vest-
ing after 5 years of service in 1986. So to keep abreast of private-
sector practice, union negotiators included fi ve-year vesting in their 
package of benefi t enhancements. 
Five-year vesting affected very few workers. The great majority 
of rail workers either have fewer than 5 years of service or more than 
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10. In 2012, the Railroad Retirement program granted pensions to 
only 100 workers with 5–10 years of service (Railroad Retirement 
Board 2014, Table B10). Their pensions were also quite small. The 
Railroad Retirement benefi t formula sets pensions at (years of ser-
vice) × (0.7 percent of average covered earnings over the last fi ve 
years of rail employment). Thus, the pensions of those 100 work-
ers were 3.5–7.0 percent of their average earnings over their last fi ve 
years of service. Many of these workers had left rail employment a 
quarter century or more prior to retirement, and the benefi t formula 
did not adjust their earnings to refl ect the subsequent rise in prices or 
wages. Infl ation and wage growth thus cut the value of their Railroad 
Retirement pensions roughly in half, to about 3 percent or less of their 
preretirement earnings.1   
The 2001 increase in survivor benefi ts was more signifi cant. 
Survivors had formerly received a continuation of their Railroad 
Retirement spousal benefi t, equal to about half their spouse’s benefi t. 
Survivors now got their deceased spouse’s benefi t. This increment, 
however, was reduced dollar for dollar by the cost-of-living increases 
in both the survivor Railroad Retirement spousal benefi t and typically 
much larger Social Security survivor benefi t—until the increment dis-
appeared. While all new widow(er)s and many existing widow(er)s 
got an increase in benefi ts, that increase would wither away, depend-
ing on the rate of infl ation, in 10–15 years. 
By far the most signifi cant increase in benefi ts introduced by the 
2001 reform was the ability of workers with 30 years of service to 
retire on full benefi ts at age 60 rather than 62. About 75 percent of rail 
workers aged 60 had 30 years of service, and the reform gave those 
who chose to retire an additional two years of “full” Social Security–
equivalent Tier I and Railroad Retirement Tier II benefi ts. If married—
and about 70 percent of rail workers that age were—the couple was 
also entitled to a spousal benefi t equal to half the worker’s “full” Tier 
I and Tier II benefi ts (Railroad Retirement Board 2014, Table S-43). 
The reform created a powerful incentive for workers aged 60 
with 30 or more years of service to retire. Railroad Retirement pro-
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vided essentially all, or nearly all, of the income they would need. A 
standard rule of thumb says retirees need about 80 percent of their 
preretirement earnings to maintain their standard of living—and less 
if they have paid off the mortgage or have children they no longer sup-
port (Palmer 2008).2  A “full” Railroad Retirement benefi t replaced 
about 80 percent of the preretirement earnings of a married worker 
and about 55 percent for a single worker.3 So a “full” benefi t provided 
a suffi cient retirement income for workers with a nonworking spouse 
or a spouse with relatively low earnings, and an income close to suf-
fi cient for those without a spouse. Also encouraging the retirement of 
workers aged 60 with 30 years of service, their pensions would only 
increase modestly, only about 2–3 percent, for each year they delayed 
retirement.4  
Workers with 30 years of service who retired at 60 thus got pen-
sions about 4–6 percent smaller than what they would get at 62. This 
was less than the additional cost to the Railroad Retirement program 
of providing these somewhat smaller benefi ts earlier and for a longer 
period of time, and for forgoing two years’ employer and employee 
payroll taxes. This additional cost for 60/30 was the primary way that 
labor took its portion of the gains of reform. And the availability of 
“full” pension benefi ts at age 60, albeit somewhat smaller than the 
“full” benefi ts available at older ages, proved hard to resist. Among 
rail workers with 30 or more years of service in 2004–2006, 62 per-
cent of those aged 60 and 49 percent of those aged 61 retired. The 
retirement rates for such workers in 1998–2001, just prior to the 2001 
reform, were 11 percent for those aged 60 and 10 percent for those 
aged 61 (Railroad Retirement Board 2001; 2007, Table S-30). 
THE CARRIERS AND THE 2001 REFORM
The 2001 reforms had two immediate effects on the carriers: the 
stepped-up retirements cut railroad employment, and the payroll tax 
cut reduced pension expenditures. The tax cut by far had the greater 
effect. 
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The 2001 reforms cut railroad employment by about 4,000 
workers.5 Workforce reductions had been major contributors to car-
rier profi tability since the end of the Second World War.  Key driv-
ers of carrier profi tability continued to economize on labor, such as 
the use of larger cars and longer trains and the shift to intermodal 
freight traffi c (Martland 2012). Railroad employment fell by 9,000 
workers from 2001 to 2002, when 60/30 was introduced—more than 
the increase in retirements attributable to the 2001 reform—and by 
another 4,000 in 2003. Railroad employment, however, then slowly 
began to rise. Even after a sharp decline in the Great Recession, the 
carriers employed 2,000 more workers in 2011 than they had in 2004. 
This suggests that the employment reduction attributable to the 2001 
reform at best had just a minor effect on profi tability.
The employment reduction attributable to the 2001 reform was 
a reduction in the number of older workers, aged 60 and 61, that the 
carriers employed. The carriers had introduced mandatory retirement 
on pension at the turn of the twentieth century precisely to terminate 
the employment of older workers whose productivity had declined. 
They initially set the mandatory retirement age at 70, which was often 
lowered to 65. But given the dramatic gains in worker health and edu-
cation, and reductions in many of the physical demands of railroad 
work, it is far from clear that workers aged 60 and 61 are much less 
productive, if less productive at all, than younger workers. This again 
suggests that the retirements attributable to the 2001 reform at best 
had a minor effect on profi tability.
The cut in the carriers’ payroll tax, by contrast, had a signifi cant 
effect. The 2001 legislation and the ratchet cut the carrier’s payroll 
tax from the prereform 16.1 percent of payroll in 2001, down in steps 
to 12.1 percent by 2007. The ratchet then kept the carriers’ tax that 
low to 2013, when it pushed it up to 12.6 percent. The carriers’ tax 
rate is expected to return to 13.1 percent of payroll in 2015. It would 
then be at the carriers’ benchmark rate in the 2001 legislation, 3 per-
centage points below their prereform 16.1 percent levy (Figure 5.1).
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Over the 10 years from 2002, when the reform began to cut their 
tax rate, to 2011, the carriers paid $17.5 billion in Railroad Retire-
ment payroll taxes. Assuming no change in payrolls, they would have 
paid an additional $4.5 billion had their tax rate remained 16.1 per-
cent—and over the last 5 of those years, about an additional $600 
million a year (Figure 5.2). Assuming a 35 percent marginal tax rate, 
the 2001 reforms added $3 billion to the carriers’ after-tax earnings 
over this 10-year period, and about $400 million a year over the last 
5 of those years.
These tax savings made a reasonably signifi cant contribution 
to carrier profi ts. From 1996 through 2004, U.S. Class I Railroads, 
which earn the bulk of industry profi ts, earned about $4 billion a year 
or less. Class I profi ts then increased rapidly, reaching $12.1 billion 
in 2012. Figure 5.3 shows the estimated contribution of tax savings 
to the profi ts of Class I Railroads. The contribution to profi ts at all 
railroads is probably quite similar.
Figure 5.1  Carriers’ Railroad Retirement Tax Rate, 2001–2015
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SOURCE: Railroad Retirement Board Annual Reports, various years.
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The continuation of carrier tax cuts through the Great Recession, 
including the reductions produced by the ratchet in 2005 and 2006, 
stand in stark contrast to the spike in mandatory employer defi ned 
benefi t pension contributions when the economy turns down. Eco-
nomic downturns reduce the value of pension fund assets, and the 
value of assets in the NRRIT fell nearly 20 percent in 2008 because 
of the decline in equity prices.  Employer defi ned benefi t plans typi-
cally measure the adequacy of their assets against the present value 
of future obligations, a yardstick highly sensitive to current interest 
rates. As interest rates fell sharply in the Great Recession, the present 
value of Railroad Retirement obligations jumped dramatically, pro-
ducing a signifi cant drop in the program’s funded ratio—the ratio of 
assets to the present value of plan obligations. Had Railroad Retire-
ment tax rates been pegged to this funded ratio, carrier taxes would 
have moved sharply higher. But Railroad Retirement measures the 
Figure 5.2  Estimated Contribution of Payroll Tax Cut to Carrier 
Profi ts, 2002–2011 ($ millions)
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SOURCE: Author’s calculations, based on data from Railroad Retirement Board 
(2014, Statistical Table D1).
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adequacy of trust fund assets against the far more stable yardstick 
of annual benefi t outlays and sets its tax rate based on the trailing 
10-year average of that ratio. After the crash of 2008, the ratio of Rail-
road Retirement assets to outlays did fall, though not nearly as far as 
the ratio of assets to the present value of future Railroad Retirement 
obligations. As the trailing 10-year average fell slowly, carrier tax 
rates were stable and below the program’s benchmark 13.1 percent 
rate throughout the Great Recession. 
When downturns depress the funded ratios of employer defi ned 
benefi t pension plans, the government requires employers to increase 
their contributions to quickly restore the plans’ ability to pay promised 
benefi ts. To the extent the carriers retained and invested their payroll 
tax savings, those tax cuts also shored up Railroad Retirement, as the 
Figure 5.3  Estimated Contribution of Payroll Tax Cut to Carrier 
Profi ts (%), 2004–2012
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SOURCE: Author’s calculations. Tax saving based on data from Railroad Retirement 
Board (2014, Table D1), assuming the share of Class I railroads in Tier II compensa-
tion is the same as their share of Tier I compensation; profi t estimates based on data 
from Surface Transportation Board (2014).
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program has a contingent claim on the carriers.  Should the Railroad 
Retirement’s fi nances weaken, as indicated by a decline in the trailing 
10-year average ratio of assets to outlays, the ratchet increases the 
carriers’ tax rate. Although not legally specifi ed, it was also gener-
ally understood that the carriers would be required to increase their 
contributions beyond what the ratchet demanded, if need be, to keep 
the program afl oat. 
It is impossible to say with any precision how much of the tax 
savings the carriers retained and invested, as opposed to paying out as 
dividends. This is especially so as the tax savings became a relatively 
small contributor to railroad earnings. Nevertheless, the carriers 
made increasingly large investments as their earnings rose, with their 
investments rising roughly dollar for dollar with the increase in earn-
ings (Figure 5.4). The carriers have internal hurdle rates—expected 
rates of return on investment projects—well above the expected 
Figure 5.4  Class I Railroad Profi ts and Investments, 2003–2012 
($ billions)
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return on fi nancial assets. The Great Recession had also cut the cost of 
capital and investment goods and services, increasing the attractive-
ness of long-term infrastructure investments in expanding businesses 
such as intermodal traffi c and Western coal. The portion of the tax 
savings that the carriers retained and invested thus probably earned 
much higher returns than had it been invested in fi nancial assets by 
the NRRIT. There is no guarantee that the value this investment cre-
ated will be there when needed by the Railroad Retirement program. 
But it is fair to say that in addition to strengthening the carriers, the 
tax savings to some degree also strengthened Railroad Retirement. 
The tax cuts were not simply value lost by the program.
THE CARRIERS AND THE 2001 REFORM GOING FORWARD 
The carriers’ tax is rising back to 13.1 percent of payroll, the 
benchmark set in the 2001 reform, and is projected to rise still fur-
ther. The carriers’ taxes, and gains from the 2001 reform, thus depend 
on how well the program negotiates the upcoming demographic 
transition. 
The Railroad Retirement program was initially designed as a 
pay-as-you-go plan, with a trust fund to cushion transient shocks. The 
ratchet was designed to raise taxes and beef up the trust fund when 
the cushion got too thin. In any pay-as-you-go plan, the program’s 
fi nances largely depend on the ratio of retirees receiving benefi ts to 
tax-paying workers. That ratio currently stands at 2.5 benefi ciaries 
for each active worker, a legacy from the days when the railroads 
employed many more workers than they currently do. The ratio of 
assets to outlays is unlikely to rise, and tax rates are unlikely to fall, 
until that ratio of benefi ciaries to workers falls below two. 
The number of Railroad Retirement benefi ciaries going forward 
is reasonably predictable. The future course of railroad employment, 
on the other hand, has historically been hard to predict. The triennial 
actuarial valuations of the Railroad Retirement program thus pro
ject the program’s fi nances using three different employment trajec-
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tories. The trajectories in the most recent 25th Actuarial Valuation, 
released in June 2012, were a mild decline, a steeper decline, and a 
much steeper decline over the fi rst half of the century, with railroad 
employment stabilizing thereafter (Figure 5.5). 
The valuation’s optimistic projection, based on a mild decline in 
railroad employment, projects the account benefi ts ratio declining to 
about three times annual outlays by 2025 but then rising steadily over 
the next three decades, as the ratio of benefi ciaries to workers falls 
below 2, and stabilizing at about eight times annual outlays a bit after 
midcentury (Figure 5.6, Panel A).
The valuation’s intermediate projection, based on a steeper 
decline in railroad employment, has the account benefi ts ratio falling 
below three in 2020, to about two times annual outlays from 2026 to 
2029, then rising above three times outlays through midcentury. The 
decline in railroad employment is then projected to end and ratio of 
Figure 5.5  Railroad Employment Projections, 25th Actuarial Valuation
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SOURCE: Railroad Retirement Board (2014).
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benefi ciaries to workers falls below 2. The ratio of assets to outlays 
again rises steadily over the next three decades and stabilizes at a bit 
more than eight times annual outlays toward the end of the century 
(Figure 5.6, Panel B). 
The valuation’s pessimistic projection, based on much steeper 
employment decline that was widely viewed as highly unlikely, shows 
a negative account benefi ts ratio in 2035 and every year thereafter: it 
shows the trust fund exhausted in 2035 and the program incurring 
ever-mounting debts to pay promised benefi ts (Figure 5.6, Panel C). 
The report thus cautiously concludes that “barring a sudden, unan-
ticipated, large drop in railroad employment or substantial investment 
losses, the railroad retirement system will experience no cash fl ow 
problems during the next 23 years”—to 2035 (25th Actuarial Valu-
ation, p. 2). 
The system was not expected to experience cash fl ow problems 
over those 23 years because the ratchet would raise carriers’ tax rates 
in response to declines in the trailing 10-year average of the ratio of 
assets to outlays. Should the optimistic projection prove accurate, the 
ratchet would push the carriers’ tax rate above the 2001 benchmark, 
13.1 percent, from 2022 to 2038, as that average ratio fell below four 
times benefi t outlays. But the carriers’ tax rate would never top the 
prereform 16.1 percent. The 2001 reform thus would continue to have 
a positive effect on carrier earnings as the watermelon passed through 
the snake (Railroad Retirement Board 2014, p. 16). 
Should the intermediate projection prove accurate, the ratchet 
would push carriers’ taxes above the prereform 16.1 percent rate 
from 2027 to 2039, as the 10-year average ratio fell below three times 
annual outlays. The carriers’ tax rates over that 13-year period would 
be 4.2 percentage points higher, on average, than their prereform rate. 
But over the 25 years from 2002 to 2026, when the carriers employed 
many more workers, their tax rates would, on average, be 3.6 per-
centage points less. So, even should railroad employment follow the 
intermediate trajectory, reform would still leave the carriers better off. 
To the extent they retained and invested their tax savings over the fi rst 
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Figure 5.6  Projected Current and Trailing 10-Year Average Ratio of 
Railroad Retirement Assets to Outlays
Panel A: Optimistic Employment Projection
Panel B: Intermediate Employment Projection
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25 years of reform, and the returns on those investments equaled or 
exceeded their internal investment hurdle rates, the carriers would 
be much better off and be in a stronger position to pay the higher tax 
rates projected from 2027 to 2039 (Railroad Retirement Board 2014, 
p. 17). 
Should the pessimistic projection prove accurate, the ratchet 
would push the carriers’ tax rate above the prereform 16.1 percent 
in 2025, and to the maximum 22.1 percent 2 years later. But these 
increases would not keep the system afl oat. If nothing else were done, 
the trust fund would be empty in 2035, 23 years after the projection 
was released. The carriers would then be expected to shore up the 
program, or at least be the primary contributor.  Such a sharp decline 
in railroad employment, however, would also overwhelm the pre-
reform system. In the 22nd Actuarial Valuation, the last conducted 
prior to the 2001 reform, the pessimistic projection depleted the trust 
Panel C: Pessimistic Employment Projection
SOURCE: Railroad Retirement Board 25th Actuarial Valuation.
Figure 5.6  (continued)
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fund even more quickly—in 21 years after the report was released. 
The carriers could be worse off as a result of the 2001 reform, espe-
cially if the program retained 60/30. But as workers would probably 
not retain 60/30, the carriers would probably not be signifi cantly 
worse off (Railroad Retirement Board 2003, p. 20; 2014, p. 18).
The future trajectory of railroad employment is the only risk fac-
tor addressed in Railroad Retirement’s triennial actuarial valuations. 
But the 2001 reform also exposed the program to new risk factors. By 
cutting taxes and increasing benefi ts, it made the program dependent, 
for at least a quarter century, on large cash transfers from the NRRIT. 
By allowing the investment of Railroad Retirement assets in equities, 
it then exposed the trust fund and its ability to make transfers to sig-
nifi cant fi nancial market risks. 
A key fi nancial risk is that the return on trust fund assets will 
be less than expected. The most recent actuarial valuation assumes a 
reasonable 7 percent nominal return—4.2 percent above its assumed 
2.8 percent infl ation rate. More troublesome is the risk of sharp fl uc-
tuations in asset values. The ratchet was designed to respond slowly 
to fi nancial shocks. The market crash of 2008, admittedly a highly 
unusual event, illustrates how quickly the program’s fi nances could 
sour without any tax response. The program’s fi nances benefi ted dur-
ing the post-crash period from unexpectedly strong railroad employ-
ment, which maintained payroll tax receipts and reduced demands 
for trust fund transfers. As economic downturns typically reduce both 
employment and asset values, it seems reasonable to expect employ-
ment shocks to amplify, not dampen, future fi nancial shocks. 
Projections in the most recent actuarial valuation based on the 
intermediate employment trajectory had trust fund assets at two to 
three times annual outlays from 2020 to 2035, and only rising above 
four times annual outlays after 2060. Assets equal to two to four times 
outlays is a very comfortable cushion for a national pay-as-you-go 
Social Security program, with assets invested in Treasuries and ben-
efi ts covered by payroll tax receipts. It is not such a comfortable cush-
ion for the far less stable Railroad Retirement program, with a trust 
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fund invested in risky assets, tax rates at or close to the maximum 
defi ned by the ratchet, and large trust fund transfers needed to pay 
benefi ts (Railroad Retirement Board 2014, p. 17). 
The program’s vulnerability to sharp declines in asset values in 
the intermediate projection peaked early on. In 2020, when the ratio 
of assets to outlays was projected to fall below three, tax receipts were 
projected to cover less than 70 percent of benefi t payments. But the 
ratchet raised the carriers’ tax rate in response to the declining ratio 
of assets to outlays, and the need for trust fund transfers subsided. 
Tax receipts were actually projected to exceed benefi t outlays from 
2030 to 2036, eliminating the need for trust fund transfers and raising 
the value of trust fund assets above three times annual outlays. The 
ratchet then reduced the carriers’ tax rate, and tax receipts again fell 
below benefi t outlays. The program would need trust fund transfers to 
cover about 20 percent of benefi t payments, and assets would remain 
below three and a half times annual outlays. As illustrated by the 
effects of the 2008 crash, Railroad Retirement remained vulnerable 
to a sharp decline in asset values. This vulnerability continued until 
the decline in payroll employment slowed. When the employment 
decline ceased and the ratio of benefi ciaries to workers fell below 
two, the program’s fi nances rapidly improved. Assets in the trust fund 
rose quickly, even though the ratchet was reducing payroll tax rates 
and trust fund transfers had to cover an increasingly large share of 
benefi t payments. With trust fund assets rising above eight times out-
lays after 2080, Railroad Retirement’s ability to pay benefi ts should 
no longer be vulnerable to sharp but transient declines in asset values 
(Figure 5.7). 
The ability of the Railroad Retirement program to pay promised 
benefi ts does not depend solely on the ratchet’s ability to keep the 
program on track. It depends on the ratchet’s ability to give Congress 
(and the industry) enough time to respond to shocks that overwhelm 
the ability of its sluggish tax adjustments to assure benefi t payments. 
Should trust fund assets fall below three times annual outlays while 
the program requires signifi cant transfers to pay benefi ts, Congress 
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SOURCE: Railroad Retirement Board (2014).
(and the industry) would likely develop contingency plans to shore 
up the program. 
The 2001 reform was largely developed assuming railroad 
employment would follow the optimistic trajectory, as that trajec-
tory had been the most accurate projection of industry employment. 
Since the most recent actuarial valuation, railroad employment has in 
fact been stronger, and the program’s ratio of assets to outlays higher 
than that valuation’s optimistic projections. Railroad employment in 
March 2012 was 234,000—5,000 more than the optimistic projec-
tion’s 229,000. Assets in the Railroad Retirement Trust Fund were 
4.96 times annual outlays at year-end 2012, signifi cantly higher than 
the 4.75 times annual outlays in the optimistic projection (Railroad 
Retirement Board 2014; NRRIT 2012). Railroad Retirement has a 
long way to go before the watermelon has passed through the snake. 
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But these early indications are encouraging, and they support the 
view that the current program will survive the watermelon with its 
current design intact, providing workers enhanced benefi ts and the 
carriers lower tax rates. 
THE FUTURE 
Railroad Retirement seems likely to negotiate the upcoming 
demographic transition with its current design intact. The program’s 
fi nances should then signifi cantly improve, either by the middle of 
the century under the optimistic projection or toward the end of the 
century under the intermediate projection. Both projections have trust 
fund assets then stabilizing at a bit more than eight times benefi t out-
lays and taxes falling to 12 percent of payroll. The carriers would then 
be subject to a 10.1 percent payroll tax and the workers a 1.9 percent 
tax. These taxes would cover about 75 percent of benefi t outlays, and 
transfers from the trust fund, now between 8 and 8.5 times annual 
outlays, would cover the remaining 25 percent.  
The program’s fi nances would then seem reasonably stable. It 
would have an adequate trust fund balance to cushion shocks, with 
the ratchet having enough time, range, and responsiveness to adjust 
tax rates to keep the program on track. Should the trailing 10-year 
average ratio of assets to outlays fall below 8, the ratchet would raise 
the payroll tax from 12 to 14 percent. With taxes covering 75 per-
cent of benefi t outlays, a 2-percentage-point change in the payroll 
tax rate—a 17 percent swing—would have a dramatic effect on the 
need for trust fund transfers. Assuming 90 percent of tax receipts 
come from the payroll tax, with the remainder from income taxes on 
benefi ts returned to the program, a 2-percentage-point increase in the 
payroll tax would cut the required trust fund transfer over 40 percent. 
The required trust fund transfer would then be less than 2 percent of 
a trust fund balance equal to just 7 time benefi t outlays. This in time 
should be suffi cient to raise the value of trust fund assets above 8 
times annual outlays and lower the payroll tax back to 12 percent. 
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Nor should there be strong pressures to raise benefi ts or lower 
taxes. The carriers’ 10.1 percent tax would be somewhat higher than 
the employers’ traditional 7–8 percent of payroll cost for a defi ned 
benefi t pension plan, so labor could expect the carriers to resist 
demands for further benefi t enhancements. The tax, however, would 
not be so high that the carriers could expect labor to accept benefi t 
reductions to lower the carriers’ 10.1 percent levy. 
There could be pressure, however, to move Railroad Retirement 
from a pay-as-you-go to a prefunded program. With trust fund assets 
exceeding eight time annual outlays, responsible for providing a quar-
ter of annual benefi t outlays, the program in fact would no longer be 
funded on a pay-as-you go basis. Shifting to prefunding, with pro-
gram rules adjusting taxes and/or benefi ts to assure suffi cient assets in 
the trust fund to pay promised pensions, would probably not require 
major tax increases or benefi t cuts. Railroad Retirement at some point 
will need to make this transition. While the railroads will probably be 
a viable industry for another 100 years, it probably will not for 1,000 
years. Unless the program shifts to a prefunded design, at some point 
it could fail and Railroad Retirement pensions would not be paid. 
The long history of railroad pensions is full of change as well 
as continuity. Pension programs are inherently long-term arrange-
ments, with future obligations dependent on events in the past.  They 
hold claims created during an employee’s working years for income 
many decades in the future. Those claims have rarely been fulfi lled 
in the same institutional setup in which they were granted. The 2001 
reforms thus will probably not be the last restructuring of the Railroad 
Retirement program.
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Notes
1. If prices on average rise 2 percent a year and wages 1 percent above 
infl ation, the value of a benefi t earned 25 years in the past, as a replace-
ment of preretirement earnings, would be cut over 50 percent.
2. Rail workers also received retiree medical benefi ts, which reduced the 
retirement income needed to maintain their standard of living and also 
covered the risk of needing to pay for rising medical expenses as they 
aged. 
3. In 2012, the average monthly pension for workers retiring early on 
“full” benefi ts was about $3,600 a month: sum of Tier I and Tier II 
benefi ts for workers retiring before their “Full Retirement Age” (Rail-
road Retirement Board 2014, Table B9). Workers with 30 or more years 
of service then earned an estimated $6,600 a month: average Tier I 
covered compensation in 2010 was $6,150 (Railroad Retirement Board 
2010, Table S-41); assuming nominal wage growth of 3.5 percent per 
annum, average Tier I covered compensation in 2012 would be $6,600 
a month (while Tier I covered compensation excludes compensation 
above the Social Security wage cap, the great majority of rail workers 
earned less than the Social Security wage cap). Assuming a spousal 
benefi t equal to half the worker’s benefi t, or $1,800, couples would 
get $5,400 a month, over 80 percent of the worker’s preretirement 
earnings ($5,400/$6,600); and single workers would get 55 percent 
($3,600/$6,600).
4. Tier I Social Security–equivalent benefi ts are based on the average 
of the worker’s highest 35 years of covered earnings—earnings on 
which the worker paid either Railroad Retirement or Social Security 
payroll taxes—with earnings prior to age 60 indexed by the growth of 
national average wages. For workers with 35 years of covered earn-
ings, the additional year of earnings would have a negligible effect on 
that average. For workers with less than 35 years of covered earnings, 
it could increase that 35-year average perhaps 3 percent. But due to 
Social Security’s progressive benefi t formula, even a 3 percent increase 
in average earnings would raise the benefi t of a relatively high-paid rail 
worker less than 1.5 percent. 
Tier II benefi ts would increase more, about 4–5 percent. Tier II ben-
efi ts are 0.7 percent of fi nal 5-year average earnings for each year of 
service. The additional year would increase the pensions of workers 
with 30 years of service 3.3 percent (1/30), and 2.9 percent for a worker 
with 35 years of service (1/35); as Railroad Retirement pensions are 
indexed to infl ation, benefi ts would also rise by the increase in fi nal 
5-year average earnings above infl ation, typically 1–2 percent. 
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For workers with 30 years of service who retire early, Tier I benefi ts 
are about 50 percent greater than Tier II benefi ts: the average Tier I 
benefi t for such workers in 2012 was $2,160 a month, and the average 
Tier II benefi t was $1,455 (Railroad Retirement Board 2014, Table B9). 
Delaying retirement would thus increase the pensions of such workers 
about 2–3 percent.
5. In 2012, 5,213 workers aged 60 or 61 retired on full benefi ts (Rail-
road Retirement Board 2014, Table B10). Of workers aged 60–61 
who retired on full benefi ts over the three-year period 2004–2006, 74 
percent were aged 60 and 26 percent were aged 61 (Railroad Retire-
ment Board 2009, Table S-30). Applying those percentages gives an 
estimated 3,834 workers aged 60 and 1,379 workers aged 61 retiring 
on full benefi ts in 2012. Dividing those fi gures by the retirement rates 
derived from Table S-30 in the 2012 25th Actuarial Valuation (which 
are essentially the same as those reported in the text derived from Rail-
road Retirement Board [2009]) gives 6,280 workers aged 60 and 2,865 
workers aged 61 with 30 years of service in 2012. Applying the pre-
reform retirement rates of 10 percent and 11 percent, respectively, for 
workers aged 60 and 61 with 30 years of service, gives an estimated 
691 retirements by workers aged 60 and 286 by workers aged 61, or 
an estimated total of 977 retirements by workers aged 60 or 61 with 30 
years of service had the 2001 reforms not been enacted. This is 4,236 
less than the 5,213 such workers who retired in 2012. 
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Chapter 6
Lessons for Social Security
The histories of the federal Railroad Retirement program and 
Social Security have long been closely connected. Railroad Retire-
ment was created one year before Social Security, when the govern-
ment took over the tottering pension plans of the nation’s railroad 
industry. The new federal program had the same pay-as-you-go social 
insurance structure that Congress would use for Social Security. Both 
programs would add ancillary social welfare benefi ts, for spouses and 
other dependents. The fi nances of both were signifi cantly shored up in 
1983, by the same Congressional committees, responding to similar 
fi nancial issues. And the use of equities became central to proposals 
to reform each program in the 1990s. 
From the creation of the Railroad Retirement and Social Security 
programs in the 1930s through the end of the 1990s, the trust funds 
of each program held only U.S. Treasury bonds. A well-established 
principle of fi nance nevertheless held that equities offered higher 
expected returns than Treasuries, at the price of higher expected risk. 
The long bull market in stocks, running from the early 1980s through 
the end of the 1990s, provided a powerful object lesson on higher 
returns on equities, and barely any lesson at all on higher risk. As 
described above, the appeal of higher returns on Railroad Retirement 
assets, if those assets were invested in equities, was the driving force 
behind the 2001 reform. When the 1994–1996 Social Security Advi-
sory Council (1997) addressed in earnest Social Security’s long-term 
fi nancing shortfall, all three proposals the Council members presented 
included the use of equities. While none of these Social Security pro-
posals has been enacted in the United States, other nations, such as 
Canada, Ireland, Japan, New Zealand, and Sweden, adopted a policy 
of investing Social Security Trust Fund assets in equities in the years 
between 1995 and 2001 (Palacios 2002). 
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The 2001 Railroad Retirement reform introduced equities, and 
the higher expected returns they offered, to cut taxes and raise benefi ts. 
The Advisory Council proposals embraced equities as an alternative 
to closing Social Security’s fi nancing shortfall the “old-fashioned” 
way—by raising taxes or cutting benefi ts. There was real resistance 
to raising Social Security payroll taxes. The payroll tax had become 
by far the largest tax most workers paid, at 15.3 percent of covered 
earnings (10.2 percent for Old Age and Survivors’ Insurance, 1.8 per-
cent for Disability Insurance, and 2.9 percent for Medicare. While the 
payroll tax is formally “split evenly” between employers and work-
ers, the employer portion is part of labor compensation and generally 
viewed by economists as reducing employee earnings nearly dollar 
for dollar, and thus largely borne by workers.) 
There was also real resistance to cutting benefi ts. Social Secu-
rity was already scheduled to replace a signifi cantly smaller share 
of household preretirement earnings for retirement at any given age, 
owing to the increase in the Full Retirement Age from 65 to 67 between 
2000 and 2017. Combined with projected increases in the taxation of 
benefi ts and in Medicare Part B premiums, which are deducted from 
Social Security checks, benefi ts are expected to replace less than 30 
percent of the “average worker’s” preretirement earnings by 2030, 
signifi cantly less than the 40 percent of the mid-1990s (Munnell and 
Sass 2006, p. 12).1  
The three Advisory Council proposals, which remain the primary 
options for introducing equities into the Social Security program, 
were to
1) invest a portion of the Social Security Trust Fund assets in 
equities; 
2) continue to invest Social Security Trust Fund assets in Trea-
suries and reduce benefi ts to what the program could fi nance, 
but add mandatory contributions to an individual retirement 
savings account that could be invested in equities; and 
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3) allow workers to divert a portion of their Social Security 
payroll tax to an individual account, which could be invested 
in equities, in exchange for a reduction in future Social 
Security benefi ts. 
The Democrats under President Clinton had proposed adopt-
ing the fi rst option—to invest a portion of the Social Security Trust 
Fund assets in stocks (Clinton 1999). The Republicans under Presi-
dent Bush had proposed the third option: allowing workers to carve 
out a portion of their Social Security payroll tax to fund individual 
accounts in which the funds could be invested in stocks. (See, for 
example, Greenspan [2001].) And each side vehemently opposed the 
other’s proposal. The Democrats viewed carve-out accounts as gut-
ting, and potentially killing, the social insurance safety net created by 
Franklin Roosevelt. The Republicans generally viewed the govern-
ment investing the Social Security Trust Fund in equities as crossing 
a critical line in its involvement in the private economy. President 
Bush, in particular, made Social Security reform a major policy initia-
tive, and he did so just as the railroad industry brought its proposal to 
Congress (Bush 2001). 
The industry proposed that the Railroad Retirement pro-
gram invest in equities and other private securities—like a private 
employer defi ned benefi t plan. The rub, however, was that Railroad 
Retirement was a government program and its assets are government 
assets. Investing the program’s assets in equities was widely seen as 
creating a precedent for doing the same with Social Security. This 
was an unwanted complication for the industry, as it generated stiff 
opposition that nearly scuttled the proposed reform—especially from 
proponents of President Bush’s individual account alternative. 
Some lawmakers suggested that the industry consider convert-
ing Railroad Retirement into a 401(k)-type individual account pro-
gram, but that was a total nonstarter— the unions would never accept 
the transition, nor was management interested. If equities were to be 
introduced into the Railroad Retirement program, it would have to be 
done using the assets in the Railroad Retirement Account.  
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Congress in the end enacted a reform of the Railroad Retirement 
program that included investment in equities. As discussed above, 
Congress did what it could to distance the investment process as 
much as possible from government. The experience of the reformed 
Railroad Retirement program nevertheless has implications for the 
investment of Social Security Trust Fund assets in equities. The most 
important implications, in increasing order of importance, are in bud-
getary accounting, the governance of trust fund investment, and deal-
ing with risk. 
GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTING 
Railroad Retirement assets are government assets, but the 
accounting treatment of the investment of Railroad Retirement assets 
in equities, in the words of the CBO, was “a signifi cant departure 
from traditional federal transactions” (CBO 2003, p. 12.) This treat-
ment, and its infl uence on policy decisions, would likely be extended 
to the investment of the Social Security Trust Fund assets in private 
securities. 
Normal government accounting would book the trust fund’s pur-
chase of private securities as a current government expenditure. It 
would also treat its sale of Treasuries to fi nance the purchase as a 
nonevent, which could increase in the government’s reported current 
defi cit and long-term debt by well over $1 trillion. 
Normal pension accounting, however, would book the trust 
fund’s purchase of private securities as an investment, not a current 
expenditure, with the cost of that investment offset by the sale of the 
trust fund’s investment in Treasuries. The transaction would change 
the composition of government assets, but it would not affect the 
income statement (i.e., the federal defi cit) or the size of the govern-
ment’s liabilities (i.e., the federal debt). 
The railroad team succeeded in winning similar treatment 
for NRRIT transactions; it did so by having Congress apply a new 
accounting treatment it had developed a decade earlier. In 1990, Con-
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gress had specifi ed that government student and home loans, fi nanced 
by the sale of Treasuries, be booked as “a means of fi nancing —a bud-
getary nonevent—rather than a current government outlay. In 2001, 
it specifi ed that NRRIT transactions likewise be treated as “means of 
fi nancing” budgetary nonevents.
Should Congress choose to invest Social Security assets in equi-
ties, the means of fi nancing precedent established for NRRIT could 
be used to avoid recording an enormous—an illusory—expenditure 
and defi cit when exchanging Treasuries for private sector securities. 
A conservative critic of the 2001 reform noted that this budgetary 
treatment created a bias in favor of using the Trust Fund, not carve-
out individual accounts, for introducing equities into the Social Secu-
rity program. Payroll taxes diverted to carve-out individual accounts 
would clearly reduce government revenues, with the reduction duly 
recorded on the government’s books. As government accounting is 
cash accounting, the reduction in future Social Security benefi t obli-
gations, resulting from the diversion of payroll taxes, would not be 
recorded. 
While the means of fi nancing treatment would avoid a major 
political impediment to investing the Social Security Trust Fund in 
equities, the treatment of the NRRIT’s annual income and loss does 
not. The interest, dividends, rents, and realized and unrealized capital 
gains on NRRIT assets are booked as government revenue—or as 
government outlays should NRRIT’s capital losses exceed the inter-
est, dividend, and rental income it collects. With a Social Security 
Trust Fund now holding over $2 trillion, the volatility of equity prices 
can be expected to regularly generate capital gains and losses of $100 
billion or more. In a unifi ed budget context, these gains and losses 
fl ow directly to the budgetary bottom line. They would also tend to 
be strongly procyclic: large capital losses in downturns, reported as 
outlays, would widen budget defi cits; large capital gains in upturns, 
reported as revenues, would shrink or eliminate budgetary defi cits. 
Swings in the value of equities held in individual accounts—whether 
carve-out or add-on accounts—would sometimes trouble and some-
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times please the account holder. But they would have no direct effect 
on the federal budget. If government accounting continues to report 
the operations of Social Security within the unifi ed budget context, 
this treatment of annual income and loss would clearly create a bias 
against investing the Social Security Trust Fund in equities.2  
GOVERNING THE INVESTMENT PROCESS
The primary concern of Congress when it enacted the 2001 
reform was the NRRIT’s ability to manage the investment of gov-
ernment assets effi ciently and without political infl uence. This, not 
accounting, was the primary substantive issue motivating resistance 
to the industry initiative. The Republican leadership was convinced 
that political pressures would inevitably affect how government assets 
were invested, which would undermine fi nancial effi ciency and—far 
more serious—the American democratic political system.
So Congress did what it could to make the investment of Railroad 
Retirement assets as much as possible a nongovernmental activity. It 
explicitly made the NRRIT a nongovernmental entity, with no gov-
ernment employees or agencies involved in its operations. It created 
the Trust by statute in the image of a private multiemployer pension 
trust—with the Trustees primarily selected by management and labor 
and the one “independent” (not “public”) trustee selected by these 
industry representatives. The statute also charged these Trustees, 
like trustees in a private pension trust, to make investment decisions 
solely in the interest of the plan participants. They were also charged 
to use industry “best practice” to develop and execute a formal invest-
ment plan. 
Consistent with the intent of Congress, the NRRIT has managed 
the assets of the Railroad Retirement program like a private pension 
trust, free of political infl uence. But despite the fears of the Repub-
licans, and hopes of the Democrats, the NRRIT experience does not 
provide much of a precedent for Social Security and the investment 
of Social Security Trust Fund assets. 
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The primary impediment in using the NRRIT as a model for 
Social Security is the lack of national private organizations that could 
legitimately select trustees of a nongovernment entity that could over-
see the investment of Social Security assets. The railroad industry 
is highly organized, with the Association of American Railroads and 
the National Railway Labor Conference representing the carriers and 
the Cooperating Railway Labor Organizations representing labor. 
These organizations have an extensive history negotiating the terms 
and conditions of railroad employment and managing joint labor-
management health and welfare plans. These organizations, implicitly 
recognized as representing rail management and labor by Section 2 of 
the Railway Labor Act and Section 105(3)(A)(ii) of the 2001 reform, 
selected the six management and labor NRRIT Trustees. If Railroad 
Retirement were a private multiemployer pension plan, these would 
be the organizations that would name the trustees of the plan’s pen-
sion trust. 
Many nations in continental Europe have national management 
and labor organizations that function as “social partners” and negoti-
ate and oversee national social security programs and other employ-
ment institutions. The status of these organizations is often defi ned in 
law and their negotiated decisions enforced by law.3 But there are no 
such organizations in the United States that could legitimately claim 
to represent all employers or employees and thus be in a position to 
oversee the investment of employer and employee contributions to the 
Social Security program. The U.S. Social Security system is purely 
a creation of the national government, with no formal “employer” or 
“employee” involvement. Unlike Railroad Retirement, there are no 
national organizations that could legitimately assume responsibility 
for managing the Social Security Trust Fund. 
Canada provides an example of a nation without social partners 
that succeeded in developing a governance structure for investing 
social security trust fund assets in equities. Its Canada Pension Plan 
Investment Board (CPPIB), which manages the assets of the gov-
ernment’s Canada Pension Plan, is a quasi-independent entity. Like 
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NRRIT, the CPPIB is subject to private-sector fi duciary mandates and 
periodic reporting requirements. To select the CPPIB directors, who 
oversee the investment process, Canada uses an elaborate decentral-
ized process involving both provincial and federal governments. The 
process, which could be a model for the United States, is generally 
seen as successful: like the NRRIT, the CPPIB is seen as operating 
like a well-run private pension trust, free of political infl uence (Mun-
nell and Sass 2006). 
The most prominent proposals for investing Social Security 
assets in equities, however, take a different tack. They would have the 
assets managed by an entity modeled on the Thrift Savings Plan for 
federal employees, and they would have its investment board nomi-
nated by the president and confi rmed by the Senate—the process used 
for selecting political appointees to government positions. Thus, the 
proposed Social Security investment board would not be well insu-
lated from political infl uence. But its investment discretion would 
be sharply constrained: it would simply select a broad market index, 
such as the Russell 3000 or the Wilshire 5000, then competitively 
bid out and monitor the investment managers selected to follow that 
index. This approach to the problem of political infl uence on invest-
ment decisions is not to exclude political infl uence but to radically 
reduce investment discretion.4 Given America’s congenital suspicion 
of government and the enormous size of Social Security’s potential 
investment in equities—estimated at 5–10 percent of the U.S. market 
with 40 percent of trust fund assets invested in stocks—this approach 
seems best. 
DEALING WITH RISK 
The most important lessons for Social Security provided by the 
reformed Railroad Retirement program deal with the management 
of risk. Pension programs are extremely long-lived institutions, and 
their fi nances will always move in unexpected ways. The 2001 Rail-
road Retirement reform introduced a mechanism—the tax adjustment 
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ratchet—that automatically raised and lowered the payroll tax to 
offset changes in the program’s fi nances. Such automatic stabilizers 
strengthen the fi nancial viability of long-term pension programs. The 
inclusion of the ratchet was also important in easing congressional 
concerns about the investment of Railroad Retirement assets in equi-
ties and other risky securities. Some type of automatic adjustment 
mechanism, similar to the Railroad Retirement ratchet, thus seems 
critically important, fi nancially and politically, to any viable program 
of investing the Social Security Trust Fund in equities. 
The tax adjustment mechanism was a key element in the initial 
designs for reforming Railroad Retirement developed by the carriers 
in the 1980s and early 1990s. The carriers had developed proposals 
for privatizing Railroad Retirement, and the ratchet was the device 
for reducing the payroll tax—then 21 percent of covered earnings—in 
the program’s transition to a normal private employer plan. When the 
carriers presented their proposal to labor, the unions saw the benefi t 
of investing Railroad Retirement assets in equities. But they saw no 
gain in giving up their statutory benefi ts, granted by an act of Con-
gress, and fl atly rejected privatization. So the parties settled on a pay-
as-you-go program, with Railroad Retirement assets invested as the 
assets in a private pension trust. In this new design, the tax adjustment 
ratchet became a device for keeping the program fi nancially stable. 
The ratchet enacted in the 2001 reform adjusted the Railroad 
Retirement payroll tax up or down, based on the trailing 10-year aver-
age of the ratio of trust fund assets to annual benefi t outlays, and was 
designed to keep trust fund assets within a target band of 4–6 times 
annual outlays. As shown in Figure 2.4, the ratchet would automati-
cally increase the payroll tax should that trailing 10-year average ratio 
fall below 4; and it would cut taxes should it rise above 6 (RRSIA 
2001, Section 204, 26 USC Section 3241). In both cases, tax rates 
would rise or fall by increasing amounts as the trailing 10-year aver-
age ratio strayed beyond the target band of 4–6 times annual outlays. 
The ratchet can thus make very large adjustments to payroll 
tax rates, pushing the rate up to 27 percent or pulling it down to 8.2 
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percent of covered payroll. This extremely broad range was due to 
the expectation that the tax needed to keep the program on track 
1) could rise and fall quite dramatically over the course of the pro-
gram’s 75-year planning horizon, but 2) would likely fall signifi cantly 
by the end of those 75 years. 
The ratchet was not designed to provide a complete solution to 
the problem of risk. It could not push the payroll tax above 27 percent 
nor below 8.2 percent of covered payroll. By basing the tax on the 
average ratio of trust fund assets to annual benefi t outlays over the 
previous 10 years, by design it responded quite slowly to changes in 
the program’s fi nances. 
Changes in Railroad Retirement fi nances that exceed the limits of 
the ratchet’s automatic responses would require a political response. 
Should an 8.2 percent payroll tax produce an ever-rising ratio of 
assets to outlays, Congress (and the industry) would need to decide 
how to cut taxes or increase benefi ts. Congress (and the industry) 
would likewise need to decide what to do should a 27 percent payroll 
tax prove insuffi cient or should the ratchet respond too slowly to a 
sudden downturn in the program’s fi nances. The critical measure of 
the ratchet’s effectiveness in such cases is whether it gives Congress 
(and the industry) enough time to fashion an adequate response. 
The enactment of the 2001 Railroad Retirement reform sug-
gests that Congress would require some type of automatic adjustment 
mechanism should it allow the Social Security Trust Fund to invest in 
equities. It also suggests that any such mechanism cannot be expected 
to provide a complete solution to the problem of risk. The design of 
the mechanism would specify the size and speed of the automatic 
adjustments, setting limits on its ability to stabilize Social Security’s 
fi nances. A suffi ciently large or long-lasting shock, which exceeds the 
mechanism’s ability to respond, would require Congress to act. On 
the other hand, automatic adjustments large enough and fast enough 
to respond to such shocks could generate reactions so strong that Con-
gress would also be required to act. The mechanism’s design could 
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only infl uence how and when Congress might intervene, not com-
pletely eliminate the need to intervene. 
A Social Security program with a trust fund invested in equities 
should be far more stable and predictable than the current Railroad 
Retirement program. This is especially true for a program’s employ-
ment base, payroll tax revenues, number of benefi ciaries, and annual 
benefi t outlays. The ratio of Social Security benefi ciaries to workers 
will rapidly rise as the baby boom generation ages but then remain 
relatively stable. Nor will the Social Security Trust Fund likely be 
invested nearly as extensively in equities as the NRRIT. A Social 
Security program that invests in equities thus should not experience 
short-term shocks anywhere near as large, relative to the size of the 
program, as those seen in Railroad Retirement. The adjustment mech-
anism could thus be designed to respond rather slowly. The American 
political process, on the other hand, has convincingly demonstrated 
its inability to manage Social Security’s fi nances. Despite knowing 
for decades that Social Security had a serious long-term fi nancing 
shortfall, the nation for decades has failed to act.5 This argues for 
allowing the automatic mechanism to make adjustments large enough 
to adequately address as many anticipated risks as possible, so Con-
gress would only need to act should those adjustments generated 
substantial political resistance. 
Several nations in recent years have introduced automatic adjust-
ment mechanisms to make their social security programs more 
sustainable. The great majority, however, operate traditional pay-as-
you-go programs with small trust funds designed to buffer short-term 
cash-fl ow shortfalls and hold only government bonds. They generally 
pay relatively high benefi ts, have relatively high tax rates, and antici-
pate revenue shortfalls in response to upcoming demographic shifts. 
Unlike the Railroad Retirement ratchet, nearly all of these automatic 
mechanisms only adjust benefi ts, not taxes—and are expected to 
adjust benefi ts downward.6   
Canada is an exception. It has a social security program with a 
large trust fund that is invested much like the NRRIT, and an auto-
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matic adjustment mechanism to keep the program’s fi nances on track. 
The Canada Pension Plan (CPP)—the earnings-related component 
of the nation’s social security program—is funded by a 9.9 percent 
tax on covered earnings, pays a benefi t of 25 percent of average 
indexed earnings, and is projected to have a trust fund equal to 6.5 
times annual outlays, responsible for providing 15 percent of annual 
benefi t payments, by 2080. The CPP also has an automatic adjust-
ment mechanism. The mechanism is not based on the ratio of assets 
to outlays, as in Railroad Retirement, but on projections by the Chief 
Actuary of Canada, conducted every three years, on the tax needed to 
sustain the program. If the projection indicates the 9.9 percent tax is 
too low, the politicians are given the opportunity to bring the program 
back into balance. If they don’t, two things happen automatically: 1) 
retiree cost-of-living adjustments are eliminated until the next trien-
nial review; and 2) taxes are raised, up to 0.2 percent of covered earn-
ings per year, up to half the difference between the current tax and the 
minimum tax needed to restore sustainability in 75 years. Should the 
next triennial review again report a shortfall, the process is repeated.7 
In one key respect, the CPP mechanism is more suited to Social 
Security’s needs than the Railroad Retirement ratchet. The CPP makes 
adjustments based on a long-term, forward-looking assessment of the 
program’s fi nances; Railroad Retirement makes adjustments based 
on much shorter-term retrospective performance. As the fi nances of 
Social Security and the CPP are far more stable and predictable than 
those of the Railroad Retirement program, it is both feasible and pref-
erable to adjust Social Security taxes and benefi ts based on long-term 
projections.8 It might also be advisable to include a trigger based on 
a shorter-term assessment; given the experience of the sharp fi nan-
cial shocks since 2008, it might be advisable to include a secondary 
adjustment mechanism that responds to risks of near-term cash-fl ow 
shortfalls that the 75-year projection might not fl ag. But adjustments 
based on long-term projections would seem to be the norm, with any 
based on shorter-term assessments as a safety measure. 
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The adjustments automatically made by the CPP, on the other 
hand, are decidedly not appropriate for Social Security. The burden 
of the CPP’s tax and benefi t adjustments by design falls most heavily 
on retirees. The three-year suspension of cost-of-living adjustments 
cuts the purchasing power of benefi ts 6 percent if infl ation is run-
ning 2 percent a year, and 9 percent if infl ation is running 3 percent 
a year. And these cuts are permanent—should cost-of-living adjust-
ments resume, they resume from these post-freeze levels. The tax 
increases, by contrast, are unlikely to be anywhere near as large. And 
they could be reversed should conditions improve. Canada adopted 
these adjustments not because it viewed them as equitable, but as a 
political instrument: the threat of a benefi t freeze is expected to mobi-
lize retirees to “put a cannon” at the head of the politicians to get them 
to restore sustainability some other way. Given the U.S. track record 
in managing Social Security’s fi nances, it seems advisable to adopt 
adjustments expected to be put in place, not to pressure politicians 
to act.9  
That the Railroad Retirement ratchet automatically adjusts only 
taxes, that nearly all social security programs with automatic mecha-
nisms adjust only benefi ts, and that the CPP adjusts both, is not espe-
cially signifi cant for Social Security. The nations that introduced 
automatic adjustments to lower benefi ts generally had programs pay-
ing benefi ts that replaced a much higher share of preretirement earn-
ings than the U.S. Social Security program. The Railroad Retirement 
program is modeled on standard employer-defi ned benefi t pension 
plans, in which benefi ts are defi ned and the employer, typically, is 
responsible to pay what’s needed. The CPP adjusts both taxes and 
benefi ts, but it placed the primary burden on benefi ts as a political 
device. So what to adjust, and how much to adjust, remain open ques-
tions. Social Security could adjust taxes and benefi ts; the adjustments 
could target those better equipped to bear risk, such as higher-income 
workers and benefi ciaries or employers as opposed to workers; those 
who bear risk could also be compensated by lower expected tax rates 
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and higher expected benefi ts—from where their taxes and benefi ts 
would be should the program not invest in equities.10  
One lesson Railroad Retirement offers, however, is how to 
respond to surpluses. The primary concern when reviewing automatic 
adjustment mechanisms is how they handle shortfalls—whether they 
raise taxes, cut benefi ts, delay eligibility, or make some other adjust-
ment. But how do they handle surpluses? The Railroad Retirement 
ratchet lowers taxes. One could assume that rail workers would spend 
that tax reduction on current consumption. For the carriers, the reduc-
tion would increase earnings, which would be used either to increase 
dividends or be retained and invested. To the extent that tax reductions 
on the carriers are retained and invested, the tax reduction increased 
the carriers’ fi nancial strength. Should the Railroad Retirement pro-
gram subsequently face a fi nancial shortfall, the carriers would be in 
a better position to pay the higher taxes the ratchet would introduce. 
Something similar could be done in Social Security—say by direct-
ing tax reductions on workers into individual accounts, which could 
be accessed only 1) to pay future payroll taxes, should taxes subse-
quently need to rise above the statutory rate; or 2) should the worker 
retire, become disabled, or die, or the value of the account exceed 
some specifi ed amount.11 
Finally, it is important to note that an automatic adjustment 
mechanism presupposes a program in balance, or moving toward bal-
ance. If Congress would require an automatic adjustment mechanism 
for the Social Security Trust Fund to invest in equities, the investment 
in equities would need to be part of a package that produced a sus-
tainable Social Security program. This would necessarily mean some 
combination of higher taxes or lower benefi ts. This would reduce the 
gap between tax revenues and benefi t outlays, which income from 
the trust fund would need to fi ll, well below the currently projected 
shortfall of 25 to 30 percent scheduled benefi ts. 
A critical benefi t of any reform package that included the invest-
ment of trust fund assets in equities would thus be the automatic 
adjustment mechanism. Though included in response to political 
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demands for a mechanism to deal with risky equities, it would adjust 
the Social Security program in response to any shock, not just fi nan-
cial shocks. Had such a mechanism been in place, it would have intro-
duced adjustments to Social Security, without the need for Congress 
to act, in response to the demographic shocks that have made the cur-
rent program unsustainable, and it would keep the program sustain-
able for generations to come. 
Notes
 1. The increased employment of married women, which raised a house-
hold’s preretirement earnings far more than postretirement benefi ts, 
further diminished Social Security’s role in providing an income to the 
nation’s elderly (Munnell, Sanzenbacher, and Soto 2007). 
 2. One Social Security accounting issue that the Railroad Retirement expe-
rience did not address is how to treat the return on equities in fi nancial 
projections. Both the Social Security and Railroad Retirement actuar-
ies, like other actuaries, use the expected return on equities in making 
such projections. Government budgetary offi cials, like many fi nancial 
analysts, use the risk-adjusted return that “costs” the risk in equities as 
the difference between the expected return and the return on riskless 
government securities. After deducting this “cost,” they use the much 
lower return on government securities in their fi nancial projections. This 
is a very thorny and contentious issue, which the Railroad Retirement 
experience did nothing to resolve or clarify.
 3. For a discussion of the Dutch system, which does invest social security 
assets in equities, see Ponds and van Riel (2007).
 4. The proposed board would need to choose the broad market index, 
which could include foreign securities. It would not be allowed take an 
active role in corporate governance: Social Security shares would not 
be voted (which tends to favor incumbent management), shares would 
be voted similarly to the other shareholders, or the investment managers 
would vote the shares “in the best interest of program participants,” as 
is done in the Thrift Savings Plan. For a discussion of these and other 
issues, see Munnell, Balduzzi, and Gist (1998) and White (1996).
 5. For some reasons why, see Diamond (1994). 
 6. For a review see OECD (2012). 
 7. The discussion of the CPP follows Monk and Sass (2009). Sweden also 
invests social security trust fund assets in equities, and investment per-
formance is incorporated in program’s automatic adjustment mecha-
nism when setting benefi ts (Palacios 2002). 
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 8. This assumes that there is no constitutional issue in changing tax rates 
based on actuarial projections provided by the executive branch of gov-
ernment, rather than an act of Congress. 
 9. As Monk and Sass (2009) write, “Concentrating the burden on current 
retirees is clearly at odds with general notions of social insurance objec-
tives. The distribution of losses is also quite unfair: workers who will 
retire soon will pay the modestly higher contributions and then retire on 
unreduced benefi ts; workers just a few years older will have their CPP 
benefi ts substantially reduced. A small reduction in all benefi ts paid out 
over the next 76 years, a reduction akin to the increase in contributions, 
would be far more consistent with social insurance objectives” (p. 4).
 10. For an innovative employer plan that shares risk, see Munnell and Sass 
(2013). 
 11. Congress might also allow workers to access this account should they 
have a hardship or need the funds for a “socially approved” use, such as 
paying for college or buying a house. A similar treatment could be used 
for employer contributions, though this could raise thorny legal issues, 
and passing the reduction to the employer is exactly analogous as the 
treatment used in Railroad Retirement. 
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About the Institute
The W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research is a nonprofi t research 
organization devoted to fi nding and promoting solutions to employment-
related problems at the national, state, and local levels. It is an activity of 
the W.E. Upjohn Unemployment Trustee Corporation, which was established 
in 1932 to administer a fund set aside by Dr. W.E. Upjohn, founder of The 
Upjohn Company, to seek ways to counteract the loss of employment income 
during economic downturns.
The Institute is funded largely by income from the W.E. Upjohn Unemploy-
ment Trust, supplemented by outside grants, contracts, and sales of publica-
tions. Activities of the Institute comprise the following elements: 1) a research 
program conducted by a resident staff of professional social scientists; 
2) a competitive grant program, which expands and complements the internal 
research program by providing fi nancial support to researchers outside the 
Institute; 3) a publications program, which provides the major vehicle for dis-
seminating the research of staff and grantees, as well as other selected works 
in the fi eld; and 4) an Employment Management Services division, which 
manages most of the publicly funded employment and training programs in 
the local area.
The broad objectives of the Institute’s research, grant, and publication pro-
grams are to 1) promote scholarship and experimentation on issues of public 
and private employment and unemployment policy and 2) make knowledge 
and scholarship relevant and useful to policymakers in their pursuit of solu-
tions to employment and unemployment problems.
Current areas of concentration for these programs include causes, conse-
quences, and measures to alleviate unemployment; social insurance and 
income maintenance programs; compensation; workforce quality; work 
arrangements; family labor issues; labor-management relations; and regional 
economic development and local labor markets.
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